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LAND LAW FEDERALISM 
Ashira Pelman Ostrow* 
ABSTRACT 
Land exhibits a unique duality. Each parcel is at once absolutely fixed in 
location and inextricably linked to a complex array of interconnected systems, 
natural and man-made. Ecosystems spanning vast geographic areas sustain 
human life; interstate highways, railways, and airports physically connect 
remote areas; networks of buildings, homes, offices, and factories create 
communities and provide the physical context in which most human interaction 
takes place. Despite this duality, the dominant descriptive and normative 
account of land-use law is premised upon local control. In a world where 
capital and information pass freely across increasingly porous jurisdictional 
boundaries, few regulatory matters can be cabined within the borders of a 
single state, let alone a single locality. Thus, despite the mantra of localism, 
modern land-use law has evolved to incorporate a significant, though 
undertheorized, national dimension. 
This Article develops a coherent national account of land-use law. First, 
this Article establishes a doctrinal basis and normative justification for federal 
land-use law, both of which derive from the cumulative effects of local land-
use decisions on interstate commerce and the national welfare. Second, this 
Article develops a theoretical framework through which to analyze the 
substantial body of existing federal land law. Finally, the Article applies 
principles of federalism theory to outline a “local-official-as-federal-agent” 
model of land-use law that harnesses the relative regulatory capacities of each 
level of government. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is hardly unique to describe land as unique.1 In one sense, land is unique 
because it is immobile; it is, by definition, local.2 Its value is specific to its 
owner and locational context—its geography, topography, current use, and 
relationship to surrounding uses and users. Yet the uniqueness of land derives 
not only from its “localness” but also from its “nationalness”—from the role 
that it plays in national networks. Each parcel is at once absolutely fixed in 
location and inextricably linked to a complex array of interconnected systems, 
natural and man-made. Ecosystems spanning vast geographic areas sustain 
human life; interstate highways, railways, and airports physically connect 
remote areas; telecommunications towers dotting the landscape facilitate 
increasingly sophisticated forms of communication; energy infrastructure 
crosses state and local boundaries to power the nation; and networks of 
buildings, homes, offices, and factories create communities and provide the 
physical context in which most human interaction takes place.3 
Despite the expansion of the federal government over the past century, 
local governments have retained primary authority to regulate the use of land.4 
 
 1 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e (1981) (“A specific tract of land has 
long been regarded as unique and impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money.”). 
 2 Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 
297 (2011). 
 3 See JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 
17 (1987) (“[P]lace is indispensable; all human activity must occur somewhere.”); Robert C. Ellickson, 
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317 (1993) (“Because human beings are fated to live mostly on the 
surface of the earth, the pattern of entitlements to use land is a central issue in social organization.”); Eduardo 
M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829 (2009) (describing land “as an essential component 
in any human activity that requires physical space”). 
 4 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (“Land use control is the most important local regulatory power.”); Sara C. 
Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 231, 236 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing descriptive and normative view of land use involves, first and 
foremost, local control.”); Jerold S. Kayden, National Land-Use Planning in America: Something Whose Time 
Has Never Come, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 445, 449–50 (2000) (finding that local land-use laws continue to 
enjoy “a near absolute status as untouchable local government prerogatives”); John R. Nolon, In Praise of 
Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 366 (2002) (noting a 
“national understanding that the power to control the private use of land is a state prerogative, one that has 
been delegated, in most states, to local governments”); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land 
Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 839 (1983) (“Land use control in America 
has always been an intensely local area of the law.”); Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land 
Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 616 (2011) (“[L]ocal government has retained almost full authority 
over land use . . . .”); A. Dan Tarlock, Land Use Regulation: The Weak Link in Environmental Protection, 82 
WASH. L. REV. 651, 653 (2007) (“The United States has . . . enshrined the idea that land should be controlled 
at the lowest level of government, if at all.”); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments 
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Scholars and policy makers often reject the notion of an expanded federal 
role,5 even as they recognize that local zoning boards lack the capacity and the 
incentive to address complex problems,6 such as urban sprawl and affordable 
housing that are created by the cumulative impact of local land-use decisions.7 
In a world where capital and information flow freely across national and 
subnational boundaries, few regulatory matters can be cabined within the 
jurisdictional lines of a single state, let alone a single locality.8 
In response, modern land-use law has evolved to incorporate a variety of 
national concerns.9 Federal laws that directly regulate or seek to influence land 
 
and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 740 (2010) (“[Z]oning 
and land use remain largely the province of local governments.”); William A. Fischel, The Evolution of 
Zoning Since the 1980s: The Persistence of Localism § 3, at 4–5 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1686009 (noting that the most remarkable aspect of local zoning is that it 
has remained local). 
 5 See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 4, at 262 (“No serious scholar supports an expanded role for the national 
government in traditional land use regulation . . . .”); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particulars of Owning, 25 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 574, 580 (1999) (noting that “[l]and use regulation at the state level is bad enough” and that 
“[d]irect federal regulation, for many citizens, is simply taking things too far”); Kayden, supra note 4, at 451–
53 (suggesting that the size of the United States, its private-property tradition, and citizen preference for local 
control cut against national involvement); Catherine J. LaCroix, Land Use and Climate Change: Is It Time for 
a National Land Use Policy?, 35 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 124, 124 (2008), http://elq.typepad.com/currents/pdf/ 
currents35-16-lacroix-2008-1124.pdf (“It will never be time for an articulated federal land use policy; the 
tradition of local control of land use is simply too strong.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Role of Legal 
Innovation in Ecosystem Management: Perspectives from American Local Government Law, 24 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 745, 751 (1997) (explaining why property owners and local governments resist centralization of land-use 
regulatory authority); Trisolini, supra note 4, at 740 (arguing that efforts to centralize regulation of land 
“would likely provoke fierce political opposition, as many consider this a core local function, central to local 
governments’ ability to maintain autonomy”). 
 6 Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 511 (2005); Alexandra B. 
Klass & Elizabeth Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism 
Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 42–47), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012075 (articulating the desirability of federal regulation but noting that federal 
intervention is politically unfeasible absent a national crisis); Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 
30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 291 (2011) (noting the merits of federal regulation but concluding that reallocation 
of authority in land-use law is politically unfeasible); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable 
Development: Threads of a National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 389 (2002) (declaring that 
“[t]here is no doubt that a need exists for more comprehensive federal legislation on land use” but maintaining 
that the authority will and should remain local). 
 7 See sources cited infra note 36. 
 8 Robert A. Schapiro, Federalism as Intersystemic Governance: Legitimacy in a Post-Westphalian 
World, 57 EMORY L.J. 115, 120 (2007) (“In contemporary society, the dichotomy of ‘truly local’ and ‘truly 
national’ has no substance.”); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The 
Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2007); Griffith, supra note 6, at 510–11. 
 9 John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law Reform, 30 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) (describing the evolution of land-use law to incorporate state and federal influences); 
see also BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION § 1:1, at 6 
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use include federal permitting schemes under the Endangered Species Act10 
(ESA) and the Clean Water Act11 (CWA), federal siting regimes under the 
Telecommunications Act12 (TCA) and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act13 (RLUIPA), and land-use planning requirements 
imposed in connection with federal housing and transportation funding. In 
addition, many other federal laws impact land use incidentally, as a byproduct 
of their main goals, including, for example, land-use decisions that must be 
made to achieve federally mandated emissions standards under the Clean Air 
Act and the CWA’s Stormwater Phase II Rule.14  
Thus, despite the mantra of localism, a significant body of federal land-use 
law, defined broadly to include federal policies that influence the development 
of privately owned land, already exists. In the absence of a national land-use 
policy, however, observers have typically studied each federal policy in 
isolation, describing an uncoordinated federal statutory “patchwork,”15 enacted 
“piecemeal”16 and resulting in inconsistent and sometimes self-defeating 
regulatory policies.17 In contrast to other substantive areas of law,18 including, 
for example, environmental law,19 the legal literature has yet to develop a 
 
(2007); Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities’ Sake, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 69 (1998); ROBERT I. MCMURRY, A.L.I.–A.B.A. LAND USE INST., USING FEDERAL LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS TO CONTROL LOCAL LAND USE 357 (2001). 
 10 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). 
 11 Clean Water Act of 1972 § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 12 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 704(a), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)–(iii).  
 13 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).  
 14 40 C.F.R. § 122.21–.29 (2011); see also infra Part II.  
 15 Kayden, supra note 4, at 446. 
 16 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-280699, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: EXTENT OF FEDERAL 
INFLUENCE ON “URBAN SPRAWL” IS UNCLEAR 9 (1999); Randolph R. Lowell, Coastal Smart Growth, 22 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 237 (2005); Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America, Briefly, 26 J. 
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73, 73 (2005). 
 17 Green, supra note 9, at 119; see also Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective 
Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1173 (2010) (“Congress has almost 
always steered clear of establishing anything that remotely resembles a federal land use regulatory 
program . . . .”). 
 18 See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125 (2006); 
Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004); 
Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Daniel 
Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377 (2006). 
 19 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 
(2005); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); John P. 
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183 (1995); Kirsten H. Engel, 
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); Daniel C. 
Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). Other scholars have applied 
federalism theory to biodiversity conservation. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 
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robust theory of federalism to tie together the disparate strands of federal land-
use law.20  
This Article considers the body of federal land-use law as a whole and 
assesses its component parts through the lens of federalism. Part I introduces 
the cumulative effects doctrine that underlies federal regulation of “trivial” 
intrastate activity that would, in the aggregate, have a nontrivial effect on 
interstate commerce.21 Part I then applies the cumulative effects doctrine to the 
“Not in My Backyard”22 (NIMBY) phenomenon using two examples—the 
affordable-housing crisis and the challenge of achieving energy security—to 
illustrate the national implications of cumulative land-use decisions. Indeed, 
both of these shortages have been attributed, at least in part, to restrictive 
zoning policies that make it difficult to site crucial national facilities.23 
Part II argues that, despite its “patchwork” or “piecemeal” appearance, the 
body of federal land law is bound by a common objective—to counterbalance 
the harm that would result from unfettered local control over land use. Federal 
law can be used to subsidize development that would be suboptimally 
permitted by local governments, including nationally significant but locally 
undesirable land uses, such as cell phone towers, energy infrastructure, and 
affordable housing. Federal law can also be used to preserve resources that 
would otherwise be overexploited, as in the case of wetlands, endangered 
species habitats, and coastal zones. Both types of laws can be implemented 
directly by a federal administrative agency or indirectly using fiscal and 
 
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal 
Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555 
(1995); A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV. 1315 (1995). 
 20 An exception is Patty Salkin, who has argued that federal policies promoting sustainable development 
constitute a de facto national land-use policy. Salkin, supra note 6, at 382; see also Patricia E. Salkin, The 
Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 253 (2012) (providing a 
comprehensive summary of federal statutes that impact land use). 
 21 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (holding that Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause extends to regulating wheat grown solely for home consumption because of the aggregate 
impact on the national market); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (upholding the federal 
regulation of homegrown medicinal marijuana based upon Wickard’s cumulative-impact rationale). 
 22 For an overview of NIMBY, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME 
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 9–11, 262 
(2001); Michael Dear, Understanding and Overcoming the NIMBY Syndrome, 58 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 288 
(1992); and Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994). 
 23 This Article uses the term “restrictive zoning” to include local zoning policies that have the effect of 
excluding affordable housing as well as other locally undesirable uses. See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying 
text. 
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regulatory incentives to persuade local officials to participate in administering 
the federal program.24 
Such distinctions are admittedly simplistic. Many federal land laws have 
multiple objectives and utilize a mix of preemptive and cooperative techniques. 
Nonetheless, the basic taxonomy, (a) pro-development or anti-development 
and (b) direct or indirect, provides a useful starting point for theorizing federal 
land-use law. 
Building upon the theoretical framework developed in Part II, Part III takes 
up a basic question of federalism: How should authority be allocated between 
the national government and its subnational units?25 In particular, this Part 
assesses the relative regulatory capacities of each level of government—
federal, state, and local—to design and implement land-use policies that 
account for the cumulative impact of land-use decisions on the nation as a 
whole. The persistence of localism in land-use law presents a unique forum for 
federalism. Traditional theories of federalism focus on the federal–state 
relationship or on the state–local relationship.26 The relative absence of the 
state in land-use law invites federalism theorists to explore the boundaries of a 
federal–local relationship.27 
 
 24 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166–69 (1992); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 859–60, 866 (1998) (describing the use of conditional grants and conditional 
preemption to induce state cooperation). 
 25 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2008) 
(“[U]ltimately the issue of federalism is about what allocation of power provides the best governance with the 
least chances of abuse.”); Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 (2010) (asserting that what makes federalism and localism distinctive is 
that they provide “a broad-gauged, democratic account of how . . . nested governmental structures ought to 
interact”); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 254 (2005) 
(“Federalism involves the allocation of authority to a national government and to subnational units. A theory 
of federalism should guide this allocation.”). 
 26 Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal–Local Collaboration in an Era of State 
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 960 n.1 (2007); Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION 
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 65, 66 
(Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); Gerken, supra note 25, at 25–26. 
 27 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 26; Gerken, supra note 25; Hills, supra note 24; see also Erin Ryan, 
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 
MD. L. REV. 503, 573 (2007) (arguing for increased cooperation between the federal and state governments to 
address “interjurisdictional” regulatory problems that arise due to an overlap between a federally regulated 
interest and a local land-use policy). 
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Part III accepts this invitation, outlining a hybrid federal–local regulatory 
model that relies upon local officials to implement national land-use policies.28 
This “local-official-as-federal-agent” model harnesses (a) the capacity of the 
federal government, with its distance from local politics and economic 
pressures, to coordinate land use on a national scale and (b) the capacity of 
local officials, who have detailed knowledge of the land and are politically 
accountable to the local community, to implement land-use policies at the local 
level. Local implementation of a federal land-use policy is likely to produce 
individual decisions that are consistent with national priorities but sensitive to 
the local context. 
I. LOCAL LAND AS A NATIONAL RESOURCE 
In modern society, capital, information, and resources pass seamlessly 
across increasingly porous jurisdictional boundaries. Land does not. Perhaps 
because of its immobility, the dominant descriptive and normative account of 
land-use law is premised upon local control. State-level zoning, once identified 
as “the quiet revolution” in land-use law,29 failed to alter the fundamentally 
local nature of land-use law.30 Periodic calls for an increased federal role in 
land-use planning have similarly gone unanswered.31 The federal judiciary has 
 
 28 This conception is consistent with an emerging trend in environmental law scholarship pointing to the 
utility of federal–local cooperation in addressing interjurisdictional problems, such as climate change and 
environmental pollution. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 155 (2011) (arguing for federal–local cooperation to reduce environmental pollution caused by individual 
behaviors); Nolon, supra note 4, at 372–77 (discussing federal–local cooperation in ecosystem management); 
Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for 
Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1052–55 (2009) (proposing federal regulation of local 
zoning boards to facilitate national wind siting); Salkin, supra note 6, at 392 (discussing federal–local 
cooperation in brownfield redevelopment); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: 
What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 581–82 (1993) (discussing federal–local cooperation in 
biodiversity protection).   
 29 FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN 
LAND USE CONTROL (1971). 
 30 See infra note 234. 
 31 See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 4 (discussing the federal government’s limited role in land-use 
planning); Salkin, supra note 6 (describing previous efforts at national land-use reform); Wildermuth, supra 
note 16 (describing two failed attempts to bring order to land-use law through national land-use planning); cf. 
William F. Pedersen, Using Federal Environmental Regulations to Bargain for Private Land Use Control, 21 YALE 
J. ON REG. 1, 21–23 (2004) (identifying political opposition to federal attempts to shape local land use through the 
CWA and ESA).  
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consistently refused to hear zoning cases, reinforcing the notion that land-use 
law is local law.32 
In a recent article, Professor William Fischel assessed the evolution of 
zoning and concluded that “[t]he most striking quality about zoning is that it is 
still local.”33 Professor Fischel observed that, in contrast to zoning, “many 
formerly local activities such as road building, public health, care for the poor, 
school finance, prosecution of corruption, and water quality regulation (even 
drinking water regulation), have been largely pre-empted by the state and 
federal government.”34 Most commentators concur, emphasizing a national 
understanding that land use is primarily a prerogative of local governments.35 
This Part establishes a doctrinal basis and normative justification for 
federal land-use law, both of which derive from the cumulative effects of local 
land-use decisions on interstate commerce and the national welfare. Section A 
provides a context for federal land law by describing the unsuccessful attempt 
to nationalize land-use law along with environmental law during the 1970s. 
Section B introduces the cumulative effects doctrine that underlies federal 
regulation of purely intrastate activity that would, in the aggregate, have a 
nontrivial effect on interstate commerce. Section C applies the cumulative 
effects doctrine to the NIMBY phenomenon, using affordable housing and 
energy infrastructure to illustrate the potentially significant social and 
economic costs of cumulative land-use decisions.36 
 
 32 See 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 6:16 (2011) (noting the 
reluctance of federal courts to hear zoning cases); Fischel, supra note 4, § 5, at 10 (describing “procedural 
barriers to access to the federal courts”); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A 
Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 92–94 (1994) (arguing that federal courts rely upon the ripeness doctrine to 
dismiss land-use cases because “they simply do not like to hear them”). 
 33 Fischel, supra note 4, § 3, at 4. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See supra note 4. 
 36 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO 
AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 19 (1985) (“The notion that zoning is just a matter of local concern is 
incorrect when the cumulative effect of these regulations is considered.”). Professor William Buzbee makes a 
similar point in the context of urban sprawl, noting: “Even seemingly local activity such as home building 
patterns can generate much larger harms. Viewed in the aggregate, sprawling patterns of development are 
expensive for local governments that must invest in infrastructure, schools, and other services as agriculture 
and green spaces are converted to residential use.” William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory 
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10 (2003); accord Holly Doremus & W. Michael 
Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful 
for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 828–29 (2008) (arguing that local governments, in the 
aggregate, can utilize land-use controls to substantially reduce greenhouse emissions); Kevin M. Stack & 
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011) (arguing that federal 
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A. The Nonfederalization of Land-Use Law 
Less than fifty years ago, environmental regulation, like land-use 
regulation, occurred mainly at the local level37: “A few federal laws addressed 
unique national concerns such as maintaining the navigability of interstate 
waters, but beyond that, federal support for environmental protection was 
primarily limited to sponsoring scientific research.”38 During the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, Congress turned the traditional allocation of authority on its 
head, enacting comprehensive federal environmental statutes, including the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969;39 the Clean Air Amendments of 
1970;40 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,41 later 
amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977;42 and the Endangered Species Act 
of 1973.43 Given the inextricable connection between environmental quality 
and land use, a national land-use policy seemed imminent. It was not to be. 
In 1970, Senator Henry Jackson introduced the National Land Use Policy 
Act (NLUPA) into the U.S. Senate.44 The proposed law sought to engage 
public authorities at the national, state, and local levels in cooperative land-use 
 
regulation should account for all of the “one percent” producers of greenhouse gasses that, in the aggregate, 
are a substantial source of carbon emissions). 
 37 See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental 
Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 95–96 (2002) (describing local efforts to control pollution that 
preceded federal regulation); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 381 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Judicial Federalism] (“Prior to the late 
1960s, most environmental concerns were addressed at the state and local level, if they were addressed at 
all.”); Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1141, 1147–60 (1995) (discussing the history of environmental protection prior to 1970). 
 38 Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for Federal 
Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 400 (2008). 
 39 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006)). 
 40 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q). 
 41 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387). 
 42 Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387). 
 43 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544). Additional 
environmental statutes enacted during this period include the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y); the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6901–6992k); the Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26); and the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697). 
 44 See NOREEN LYDAY, THE LAW OF THE LAND: DEBATING NATIONAL LAND USE LEGISLATION 1970–75, 
at 5–7 (1976); Kayden, supra note 4, at 448 (discussing Senator Henry Jackson’s failed attempt to pass 
NLUPA). 
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planning.45 NLUPA would have provided funding for the formulation of state 
land-use plans, established a national data system to aid in land-use planning, 
and created a single federal agency to monitor federal compliance with state 
plans.46 NLUPA faced political opposition and was ultimately defeated in the 
House of Representatives.47 
A second attempt to coordinate land-use planning on a national scale under 
the Clean Air Act paradoxically served to reinforce local land-use authority. 
Under the Clean Air Act, states must design state implementation plans (SIPs) 
to meet national air-quality and emissions standards.48 In its first iteration, the 
Clean Air Act Amendments required states to include “land-use and 
transportation controls” in their SIPs if such controls were necessary to achieve 
federal air-quality standards.49 Though states that refused or were unable to 
comply with this directive risked having their state plans preempted by a 
federal implementation plan50 (FIP), both the states and the EPA recognized 
that the threat was largely illusory. The EPA lacked the administrative 
resources and localized knowledge necessary to directly implement this 
program.51 
 
 45 Kayden, supra note 4, at 448; John R. Nolon, The National Land Use Policy Act, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 519, 522 (1996) (noting that, through NLUPA, Senator Jackson intended to create “a system that would 
have infused comprehensiveness, coordination and cooperation into a system that increasingly exhibits conflict 
and confusion”). According to the legislative history, the proposed act would have established 
a national policy to encourage and assist the several States to more effectively exercise their 
constitutional responsibilities for the planning, management, and administration of the Nation’s 
land resources through the development and implementation of comprehensive “Statewide 
Environmental, Recreational and Industrial Land Use Plans” . . . and management programs 
designed to achieve an ecologically and environmentally sound use of the Nation’s land 
resources. 
S. 3354, 91st Cong. § 402(a) (1970). 
 46 Salkin, supra note 6, at 384. 
 47 LYDAY, supra note 44, at 45–47; Bronin, supra note 4, at 262; Nolon, supra note 4, at 367 (noting that 
the NLUPA was defeated, “in part[,] because it was regarded as an assault on the independent authority of the 
states to control land use”); Salkin, supra note 6, at 384. 
 48 Clean Air Act § 110(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006). EPA’s procedure for SIP approval is contained in 
40 C.F.R. § 51.101–.105 (2011). 
 49 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), § 110(a)(2)(B), 84 Stat. 1676, 1680 
(amended 1977). 
 50 Clean Air Act § 110(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1). 
 51 See Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1201 (“EPA sensed both its own political and technical limitations and 
the mammoth technical task that the states faced.”). 
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In 1977, Congress backtracked, repealing the “land-use” portion of “land-
use and transportation controls.”52 In the 1990 amendments, Congress 
cautiously imposed new transportation-control requirements in certain 
nonattainment areas but did not reinstate the land-use controls. Instead, the 
1990 amendments retreated further from land-use regulation, declaring that the 
Clean Air Act does not infringe “on the existing authority of counties and cities 
to plan or control land use.”53 
Not surprisingly, much environmental damage today is caused by 
nonpoint-source pollution resulting from land-use decisions that are within the 
jurisdictional purview of local governments.54 As the chairman of the Council 
on Environmental Quality observed when lobbying on behalf of NLUPA, land 
use is “the single most important element affecting the quality of our 
environment which remains substantially unaddressed as a matter of national 
policy.”55 
B. The Cumulative Effects Doctrine 
Although there has never been a national land-use policy, federal law has 
long been used to account for the cumulative impact of local land-use 
decisions. In 1938, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act.56 The 
Act was designed to drive up the price of wheat by strictly limiting the number 
of acres of land that could be used for the production of wheat.57 Roscoe 
Filburn grew wheat on nearly double the number of acres he was allotted under 
 
 52 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(a)(2), 91 Stat. 685, 693. 
 53 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 805, § 131, 104 Stat. 2399, 2689 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7431). 
 54 Nolon, supra note 4, at 365. Nonpoint-source water pollution includes “the runoff from impervious 
surfaces such as roofs, driveways, parking lots, and roads; erosion and sedimentation caused by development 
activities, including the removal of vegetation and site disturbance; and the movement into water bodies of 
fertilizer, pesticides, and herbicides from lawns, golf courses, and farms.” Id. at 369; accord Doremus & 
Hanemann, supra note 36, at 828–29 (arguing that local governments, in the aggregate, can utilize land-use 
controls to substantially reduce greenhouse emissions); Nolon, supra note 4, at 371 (“Nonpoint source 
pollution is the cause of nearly half of the remaining water quality problems in the United States and is 
intimately related to land use.” (footnote omitted)); A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments 
in Watershed Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 152 (2002) (describing local control over land uses 
that generate nonpoint-source pollution and impact biodiversity). 
 55 Nolon, supra note 4, at 372 (quoting Henry L. Diamond, Land Use: Environmental Orphan, ENVTL. 
F., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 31, 32) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 57 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942). 
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the Act.58 Filburn argued that the Act could not apply to the excess wheat he 
produced on his land because the wheat was intended for his private use and 
would never enter into the stream of commerce.59 
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Court unanimously upheld Congress’s power 
under the Commerce Clause to impose federal limits on local land use.60 
Although the Court agreed that Filburn’s excess wheat would have a negligible 
impact on interstate commerce, the Court declined to evaluate this activity in 
isolation. Instead, the Court considered Filburn’s activity as part of a larger 
economic enterprise and concluded that, in the aggregate, “his contribution, 
taken together with that of many others similarly situated,” would have a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce.61 
The cumulative effects doctrine, also known as the aggregate effects 
doctrine or the cumulative impacts doctrine,62 recognizes that “a single activity 
that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce may still be 
regulated [federally] if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce.”63 So, for example, Congress may 
regulate isolated, intrastate acts of discrimination,64 entirely intrastate credit 
transactions,65 surface mining on privately owned land,66 and the consumption 
of homegrown medicinal marijuana,67 if it determines that the cumulative 
impact of the regulated economic activity substantially interferes with a 
national market.68 
 
 58 Id. at 114–15. 
 59 Id. at 119. 
 60 Id. at 128–29. 
 61 Id. at 127–29. 
 62 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative 
State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 93 n.138 (2010). 
 63 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 191 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 
1999), rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); accord United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119–20 
(1941) (noting that Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a “substantial effect” on interstate 
commerce); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 93 n.138 (describing the use of the cumulative effects doctrine 
in federal law). 
 64 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); id. at 276 (Black, J., 
concurring) (considering the aggregate effect of local discriminatory acts on the interstate market); Ruhl & 
Salzman, supra note 62, at 93 (noting that employment discrimination cases often consider the cumulative 
effects of employment practices and employer statements). 
 65 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). 
 66 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981). 
 67 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
 68 During the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revival,” the Court struck down several federal statutes 
based upon its determination that the regulated activity, possession of guns near schools in United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), and gender-motivated crimes in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
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In addition, federal regulation in fields as varied as banking law, securities 
law, disability law, discrimination law, and environmental law require 
administrative agencies to consider the cumulative effect of individual actions 
on federal policy goals.69 For example, in issuing federal permits under section 
404 of the CWA, the Army Corps of Engineers does not simply consider the 
impact of filling an individual wetland but rather the cumulative impact of 
wetlands development.70 Under the ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is 
required to determine whether a proposed action, “taken together with 
cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed 
species.”71 Similarly, in administering the National Environmental Policy Act, 
the Council on Environmental Quality is charged with assessing the 
cumulative impacts of proposed actions.72 
In contrast to environmental law, traditional land-use law has not been 
nationalized. Indeed, “environmental policy and land-use policy in the United 
States remain . . . separate and distinct fields, created and implemented by 
different levels of governments and studied by different sets of academics and 
professionals.”73 The next section addresses some of the implications of this 
distinction. 
C. The Cumulative Effects of NIMBY: Beyond the Backyard 
The local land-use regulatory process is, by design, quite limited in scope. 
Land-use plans traditionally account for land located within municipal 
 
617–19 (2000), was not an “economic activity.” Both cases, nonetheless, affirmed the general authority of 
Congress to regulate economic activity that “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
558–59; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609. 
 69 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 93; see also Joseph H. Guth, Cumulative Impacts: Death-Knell for 
Cost–Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisions, 11 BARRY L. REV. 23, 49–52 (2008) (discussing 
cumulative impacts in federal environmental legislation, including the Clean Air Act National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards, CWA water-quality standards, ESA, and federal cap-and-trade systems). 
 70 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 95 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2006)). 
 71 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4) (2011); see also Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 95 n.152 (“The agency 
defines cumulative effects as ‘those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, 
that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area.’” (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02)). 
 72 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25. 
 73 Kayden, supra note 4, at 460–62; see also William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the 
Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 98 (1999) (noting that, despite decades of 
federal environmental regulation, “land use decisions and processes have remained quintessentially within the 
province of local governments”); Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustaining Ecosystem Services Through Local 
Environmental Law, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 760, 773–77 (2011) (describing the rise of local environmental 
law and contrasting it with traditional federal environmental law); Tarlock, supra note 4, at 652 (highlighting 
the regulatory disparity between national environmental objectives and local land-use authority). 
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boundaries;74 land-use decisions promote the welfare of the local community, 
often at the expense of broader national policies or goals.75 In the late 1960s, 
the term “exclusionary zoning”76 was coined to describe the way in which 
traditional land-use regulations systematically exclude low-income persons 
from many residential communities.77 
In addition to the poor, localities routinely use their zoning powers to 
exclude an extensive array of locally undesirable land uses, including group 
homes for the disabled,78 cell phone towers,79 and distributed-renewable-
energy facilities, such as backyard wind turbines and rooftop solar panels.80 
This Article, therefore, uses the term “restrictive zoning” to encompass the use 
 
 74 See Kayden, supra note 4, at 449–50; Ostrow, supra note 2, at 294. 
 75 See Griffith, supra note 6, at 526 (noting that traditional municipal law does not require localities to 
consider the extralocal impact of their decisions); Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: 
Sharing the Benefits and Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659, 659 (1997) 
(noting that “[l]and use decisions are generally made solely by local officials elected by and responsible only 
to citizens within the local municipality” but nonetheless “impose burdens on citizens outside the local 
municipality”). 
 76 Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 
21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 767 (1969); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for 
Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 561 (2007) (“While there is no universally agreed-upon 
definition of ‘exclusionary zoning,’ the term generally refers to zoning ordinances and planning codes ‘that 
have the intent or effect of excluding disadvantaged groups, particularly low- and moderate-income people and 
racial minorities, from a locality.’” (quoting Ken Zimmerman & Arielle Cohen, Exclusionary Zoning: 
Constitutional and Federal Statutory Responses, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 39, 41 (Tim 
Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005))). 
 77 See MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: EUCLID V. AMBLER 143 (2008) (noting that 
municipalities are given substantial discretion to use zoning to exclude low-income individuals); Richard 
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 365–74, 382–84 
(1990); William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. 
STUD. 317, 326–31 (2004) (describing the growth of single-family residences and local zoning as a means for 
excluding low-income individuals). 
 78 See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelters and Congregate Housing: Deinstitutionalization 
Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413, 418 (1986) (noting local opposition to 
a wide variety of group homes, including homes for “the elderly, halfway houses for prisoners, residential 
treatment facilities for alcoholics and drug addicts, . . .[homeless] shelters . . . , [and] group homes for the 
developmentally disabled”). 
 79 See Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure Security, and the NIMBY Problem, 
54 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 455–57 (2005) (describing NIMBY opposition to telecommunications towers); 
Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 28, at 1088–91 (same). 
 80 See WOLF, supra note 77, at 147–48; Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 
CONN. L. REV. 547, 571–72 (2010) (describing local opposition to renewable- and alternative-energy projects, 
including wind and solar installations); Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 1223, 1238–42 (discussing local opposition to distributed renewables); Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 28, 
at 1067–76 (assessing local opposition to wind turbines). 
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of the local zoning authority to exclude undesirable facilities, as well as 
affordable housing. 
That local zoning produces restrictive land-use patterns is hardly surprising. 
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the notion that a locality should take regional needs into consideration 
in devising its zoning ordinances.81 Instead, the Court maintained that “the 
village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate 
municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit 
within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the State and Federal 
Constitutions.”82 The Court’s decision condoned an intentionally parochial 
system that relies upon local political boundaries, rather than natural 
geographic boundaries, to determine the scope of land-use regulatory 
authority.83 
Where the local land-use process is dominated by NIMBY sentiment (as is 
the case in many elite suburban communities),84 local residents have the 
economic incentive and legal authority to exclude undesirable developments, 
without regard for the impact on regional or national land-use priorities.85 Even 
diverse localities, ones that do not fall within the affluent suburban model, may 
have a proclivity toward restrictive zoning. In a recent study of zoning 
decisions in New York City, Professors Hills and Schleicher concluded that the 
seriatim method that cities use to make land-use decisions systematically 
overprotects incumbent land users against new entrants, particularly in high-
value housing areas.86 As Professors Hills and Schleicher observe: 
 
 81 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926). 
 82 Id. 
 83 WOLF, supra note 77, at 137. 
 84 According to Professor William Fischel, small local governments are often responsive to their largest 
and most motivated constituency—homeowners. See FISCHEL, supra note 22, at 5–6; accord Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 11–12), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1816368 (describing homeowner opposition to 
new development) (footnotes omitted)). 
 85 Incumbent property owners tend reflexively to resist all new development, even development that 
would increase local property values. Ostrow, supra note 2, at 298–300; Peñalver, supra note 3, at 831–32; 
Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1655–56 (2006) (arguing that NIMBYs are motivated both by a desire to protect 
property values and by a desire to preserve community character); see also Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Minority 
Interests, Majority Politics: A Comment on Richard Collins’ “Telluride’s Tale of Eminent Domain, Home 
Rule, and Retroactivity,” 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1459, 1467–68 (2009) (illustrating the impact of NIMBYism in 
preventing arguably beneficial facilities from being constructed outside of Telluride). 
 86 Hills & Schleicher, supra note 84 (manuscript at 9). 
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The essence of the problem is that the neighbors who are 
physically close to parcels proposed for additional housing 
generally have strong incentives and organizational capacity to 
oppose changes in the zoning status quo. . . . By contrast, the 
persons benefited by [these] proposals . . . are dispersed and 
disorganized.87 
As a result of this asymmetry, the problems of locating development inside a 
city frequently parallel those caused by suburban exclusionary zoning.88 
While entirely rational from the perspective of an individual homeowner 
and of the community,89 restrictive zoning across multiple jurisdictions results 
in the systematic exclusion of certain land uses, and users, from large parts of a 
region with significant extralocal social and economic consequences. To 
illustrate, consider two contexts in which the cumulative impact of restrictive 
local zoning policies generates land-use patterns that conflict with national 
policy goals: (1) the development of affordable housing and (2) the 
development of multijurisdictional physical infrastructure, including energy 
infrastructure and telecommunications facilities. 
1. Confronting the National Housing Crisis 
As the 2007–2008 subprime-mortgage crisis and ensuing economic 
recession strikingly revealed, the modern real-estate-finance market is national 
in scope.90 When mortgages are securitized, a default in one jurisdiction affects 
investors throughout the country, with an obvious impact on interstate 
commerce.91 The national foreclosure crisis has “drained household wealth, 
 
 87 Id. (manuscript at 5–6). 
 88 For an overview of the interplay between NIMBY and affordable housing, see Iglesias, supra note 76, 
at 566; and Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming a Long History of 
Socioeconomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 497–98 (2007). 
 89 See Fischel, supra note 4, § 2, at 3 (arguing that NIMBY is a rational homeowner response). 
 90 See Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L. REV. 1031, 1033–
34 (2007) (describing the rise of a national and global market for American mortgages); Prentiss Cox, 
Foreclosure Reform amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 
743 (2008) (noting proposals to increase uniformity in foreclosure procedures “to accompany the increasing 
national or even global character of real estate finance markets”); Eric M. Marshall, Note, The Protective Scope 
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Providing Mortgagors the Protection They Deserve from Abusive 
Foreclosure Practices, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1290 & n.165 (2010) (citing sources that demonstrate that real estate 
finance has become national and argue for national regulation).  
 91 See generally Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 
32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269 (1999) (providing an overview of the way in which real estate markets have been 
transformed by securitization of mortgages). On the connection between the securitization of sub-prime 
mortgages and the financial crisis, see Shelby D. Green, Disquiet on the Home Front: Disturbing Crises in the 
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ruined the credit standing of many borrowers and devastated [a 
disproportionate number of minority] communities.”92 It has also thrust the 
challenge of developing affordable housing back onto the national agenda.  
In the wake of the foreclosure crisis, the federal government has enacted a 
variety of programs designed to subsidize the development of affordable 
housing.93 This flurry of programs is but a continuation of a decades-old 
national housing policy aimed at increasing the supply of affordable housing.94 
The United States Housing Act of 1937 declared its intent “to promote the 
general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and credit . . . to remedy 
the unsafe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, 
safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income.”95 Since that time, the 
federal government has spent tens of billions of dollars every year on a baffling 
array of housing programs and subsidies.96 
 
Nation’s Markets and Institutions, 30 PACE L. REV. 7, 10 (2009) (“High leveraging by poor credit risks in real 
estate markets . . . promoted instability in both the housing and financial markets.”); Claire A. Hill, Why Didn’t 
Subprime Investors Demand a (Much Larger) Lemons Premium?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2011, at 47, 
47–48 (discussing the subprime-mortgage crisis as the cause of the current financial and foreclosure crisis); 
Katherine L. Lewis, Note, Rebuilding a House of Cards: Envisioning Sustainable Federal Housing Policy, 35 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 473, 497–98 (2011) (noting that falling home prices and defaults on bad loans damaged 
the national subprime-mortgage market, and helped cause a financial crisis).  
 92 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2011, at 4 
(2011), available at http://www.995hope.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/SON_2011.pdf; accord Eloisa 
Rodriguez-Dod, Stop Shutting the Door on Renters: Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Evictions, 20 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 243, 269 (2010) (“The foreclosure crisis and its effect on tenants does not just impact the local 
community, but has also had a national impact.”); Marshall, supra note 90, at 1289–90 (discussing how foreclosures 
have damaged the national economy); Diana A. Silva, Note, Land Banking as a Tool for the Economic 
Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 607, 627–28 (2011) (discussing the foreclosure crisis as 
a problem that has spread beyond economically depressed urban cities). 
 93 See Nicholas J. Brunick & Patrick O’B. Maier, Renewing the Land of Opportunity, 19 J. AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 161, 184–85 (2010) (listing Obama Administration proposals to facilitate 
affordable housing); Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing—An Intimate History, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
& COMMUNITY DEV. L. 193, 206 (2011) (describing efforts to overcome challenges to the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit); Murray S. Levin, Digest of Selected Articles, 39 REAL EST. L.J. 542, 544–45 (2011) 
(describing the National Housing Trust Fund, which was created under the Housing and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2008 but is currently unfunded); Lewis, supra note 91, at 499–503 (listing government responses to 
housing-market problems, including a commitment to affordable housing). 
 94 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 93, at 542 (“Since the Great depression, U.S. federal policy has promoted 
affordable housing for the poor.”); Lewis, supra note 91, at 483–89 (describing federal efforts to increase 
affordable rental housing and home ownership for those with low incomes). See generally Edson, supra note 
93 (discussing the history of public housing in the United States). 
 95 Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 1, 50 Stat. 888, 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(A) (2006)). 
 96 David J. Reiss, First Principles for an Effective Federal Housing Policy, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 795, 795 
(2010). See generally ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2010) (surveying 
policies and programs designed to provide affordable housing to Americans); Center Mission & Goals, NAT’L 
HOUSING CONF., http://www.nhc.org/about/Center-Mission-Goals.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (“[T]he Center 
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Despite this expenditure, the gap between supply and demand of affordable 
housing continues to grow.97 Even where federal funds are available, 
exclusionary zoning policies make it extremely difficult to site affordable-
housing developments.98 Euclidean zoning is premised on the notion that 
certain high-value land uses should be insulated from other, less desirable land 
uses. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Court famously described 
multifamily housing as “a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage 
of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential 
character of the [single-family] district.”99 Exclusionary zoning ordinances and 
planning codes typically exclude multifamily dwellings, impose minimum 
building- and lot-size requirements, and restrict the number of permitted 
bedrooms.100 
The exclusionary pattern of development gained national attention with the 
Mount Laurel litigation,101 in which the Supreme Court of New Jersey required 
every municipality to provide affordable housing for its “fair share” of the 
regional demand.102 In contrast to the Euclid Court, the Mount Laurel court 
required municipalities to exercise their land-use regulatory authority to 
promote the welfare of the state as a whole, rather than exclusively to benefit 
their own residents.103 The ensuing decades have proven that Mount Laurel’s 
 
helps to develop effective policy solutions at the national, state and local levels that increase the availability of 
affordable homes.”). 
 97 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 92, at 27 (“In 1999, 8.5 million extremely 
low-income renter households . . . competed for 3.6 million [affordable and available] units . . . . By 2009, the 
mismatch had grown to 10.4 million extremely low-income renter households and just 3.7 million affordable and 
available units.” (citation omitted)). 
 98 See Tim Iglesias, Managing Local Opposition to Affordable Housing: A New Approach to NIMBY, 12 
J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 78, 79 (2002); Iglesias, supra note 76, at 566 (“Attempts to 
site affordable housing in ‘established neighborhoods’ provokes stereotypes of ‘those people’ who, it is feared, 
will bring chaos to an otherwise stable and wholesome social order in the neighborhood.”). 
 99 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926). 
 100 Iglesias, supra note 76, at 561; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential 
Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437, 452 (2006) (stating that antidiscrimination laws force communities wishing to 
exclude to use proxies, such as single-family homes on large lots in the suburbs). 
 101 See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards (Mount Laurel III), 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986); S. Burlington 
Cnty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cnty. 
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975); see also Salsich, supra note 88, 
at 473 (“The Mount Laurel litigation and similar efforts in other states became the focal point for advocates of 
affordable housing . . . because the Supreme Court had ruled a few years earlier that there was no federal 
constitutional right to housing.”). 
 102 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724–25. 
 103 See id. at 726 (“[W]hen regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state’s 
citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and 
served.”). 
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fair-share approach is the exception, rather than the rule. The regional 
approach to affordable housing has been difficult to implement in New Jersey 
itself104 and has been ignored by the vast majority of states.105 
2. The Infrastructure Challenge 
a. Energy Security as a National Policy Goal 
On August 14, 2003, cascading power failures swept across the 
northeastern United States and parts of Canada, raising serious concerns over 
the security and reliability of the nation’s energy infrastructure.106 Energy 
security has been a national policy goal for more than thirty-five years.107 
Every President from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama has made transitioning 
to a clean-energy economy a national priority.108 Congress has supported the 
development of renewable energy through legislation such as the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), which required utilities to purchase 
electricity generated from qualifying facilities, including alternative 
 
 104 See David N. Kinsey, The Growth Share Approach to Mount Laurel Housing Obligations: Origins, 
Hijacking, and Future, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 867 (2011) (discussing the battle over the formula for determining 
affordable-housing needs in New Jersey); Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social 
Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851–59 (2011) (detailing many challenges to the 
implementation of the New Jersey Fair Housing Act since 2002); Matthew Shiers Sternman, Note, Integrating the 
Suburbs: Harnessing the Benefits of Mixed-Income Housing in Westchester County and Other Low-Poverty Areas, 
44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 13–18 (2010) (noting factors that have thwarted the New Jersey Fair Housing 
Act’s effectiveness). 
 105 See John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and Throughout the 
Nation: Do Land Use Regulations that Preclude Reasonable Housing Opportunity Based upon Income Violate 
the Individual Liberties Protected by State Constitutions?, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 153, 170–76 (2004) (discussing 
efforts to curtail affordable housing in several states); Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in 
Exclusionary Zoning, 22 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 623, 623–25 (1987) (noting that a strong local preference 
for the ability to exclude renders state courts and state legislatures reluctant to address exclusionary zoning); 
Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 72 (2001) 
(describing the New Jersey courts’ success as “marginal” and noting that no other state court has gone as far as 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in encouraging affordable housing). 
 106 See Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives 
Are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 328 (2007); see also 
U.S.–CAN. POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 17–19 (2004), available at https://reports. 
energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf (describing causes of the cascading blackout). 
 107 E. Donald Elliott, Why the U.S. Does Not Have a Renewable Energy Policy 2 (John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Studies in Law, Econ., and Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 433, 2011), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1878616. 
 108 Id.; see also State of the Union 2011, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/state-of-the-union-
2011 (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
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generators,109 and the Production Tax Credit (PTC), which subsidized the 
development of wind energy.110 Moreover, renewable energy consistently 
receives overwhelming bipartisan support in national polls.111 
In recent years, significant increases in installed wind capacity112 and 
domestic production of oil and gas have reduced reliance on foreign imports 
and inched the United States closer to achieving its energy goals.113 Yet, 
restrictive zoning and NIMBYism continue to hinder the development of 
nationwide energy infrastructure.114 Siting is particularly important to the 
development of renewable energy. In contrast to traditional generating 
facilities, which could be built close to demand centers, renewable-energy 
generators must be built near renewable resources. Often these resources are 
located in remote areas, far from existing transmission lines.115 Thus, in 
addition to siting wind turbines and solar panels, a key challenge for renewable 
 
 109 Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 210(a), 92 Stat. 3117, 3144 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006)); 
see also Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 909–11 (2011) 
(describing federal policies that subsidize development of renewables); Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National 
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2010). 
 110 Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1914(a), 26 U.S.C. § 45(a); see also Jeffry S. Hinman, The Green 
Economic Recovery: Wind Energy Tax Policy After Financial Crisis and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35, 60 (2009) (crediting the PTC for encouraging 
growth of installed wind capacity). 
 111 See Energy, POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/energy.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 
2012) (collecting data from a CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll indicating that 83% of people favor 
greater reliance on wind power, a Pew Research Center study indicating that 74% of people favor increased 
federal funding of wind power, a Pew Research/National Journal Congressional Connection poll indicating 
that 78% of people favor adoption of federal RPS, and an ABC News/Washington Post poll indicating that 
87% of people favor developing more solar and wind power). 
 112 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Installed Wind Capacity, WIND POWERING AM., http://www. 
windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp#current (last updated Apr. 2, 2012) (stating that, 
between 1999 and 2011, installed wind capacity in the United States increased from approximately 2500 MW 
to nearly 47,000 MW). 
 113 Clifford Krauss & Eric Lipton, U.S. Inches Toward Goal of Energy Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
23, 2012, at A1; see also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CLEAN ENERGY PROGRESS REPORT: IEA INPUT TO THE 
CLEAN ENERGY MINISTERIAL 44–58 (2011). 
 114 See Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting 
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2005) (assessing transmission-siting challenges and remedies provided by 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005); Outka, supra note 6, at 288 (“[E]ntrenched ‘devolved federalism’ in the land 
use context contributes to the persistent disconnection between land use and the larger energy policy 
discourse.”); Chi-Jen Yang, Electrical Transmission: Barriers and Policy Solutions 16–18 (CCPP Tech. Policy 
Brief Series, Paper No. 09-06, 2009), available at http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ccpp/ccpp_pdfs/ 
transmission.pdf. 
 115 See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 28, at 1062. 
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energy is siting new interstate transmission lines linking electric generators to 
population centers.116 
In the Energy Act of 2005117 (EPAct), Congress granted FERC the 
authority to preempt state siting authority for certain transmission lines and for 
liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) terminals.118 Thus far, FERC has not had much 
success siting transmission lines119 or liquefied-natural-gas-terminals.120 
Navigating the decentralized siting process continues to hinder the 
development of a modern, secure smart grid. 
b. Process Preemption in Telecommunications Siting 
A decade earlier a similar tension between local land-use authority and 
national land-use priorities prompted Congress to include a National Wireless 
Telecommunications Siting Policy as part of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.121 The Telecommunications Siting Policy bridges the national–local 
 
 116 See Eagle, supra note 114, at 2–3; Klass & Wilson, supra note 6 (manuscript at 41–42); Jim Rossi, The 
Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1016 (2009) (noting 
that existing transmission grids cannot accommodate additional renewable-energy resources); Salkin & 
Ostrow, supra note 28, at 1062–63 (describing obstacles to wind energy, including NIMBY, inadequate 
transmission, and the intermittent nature of wind as an energy source). 
 117 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16, 22, 26, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 118 See Energy Policy Act of 2005 sec. 1221(a), § 216(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b) (2006) (providing FERC 
with power to preempt state siting authority in “national interest electric transmission corridor[s]”); see also 
Jacob Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy Act of 2005: State Powers 
in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 474 (2006); R. Seth Davis, Note, Conditional Preemption, 
Commandeering, and the Values of Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 404, 408 n.29 (2008) (“Concerns about the deleterious effects of local holdup, or 
a . . . NIMBY[] mentality, appear throughout the legislative history of EPAct.” (citing H.R. REP. No. 108-65, 
pt. 1, at 170 (2003); and 151 CONG. REC. S7267 (daily ed. June 23, 2005) (statement of Sen. Craig L. 
Thomas))). 
 119 Klass & Wilson, supra note 6 (manuscript at 12); Rossi, supra note 116, at 1033–35. 
 120 See Joan M. Darby et al., The Role of FERC and the States in Approving and Siting Interstate Natural 
Gas Facilities and LNG Terminals After the Energy Policy Act of 2005—Consultation, Preemption and 
Cooperative Federalism, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 335, 339, 384 (2010–2011) (concluding that the 
changes enacted pursuant to EPAct have not made the LNG approval process quicker or more organized); 
Sheila Slocum Hollis, Liquefied Natural Gas: “The Big Picture” for Future Development in North America, 2 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 5, 18, 22 (2007) (explaining that local opposition to LNG terminal 
construction is common); James C. Erdle, Jr., Note, Controlling LNG: AES Sparrows Point LNG, LLC v. 
Smith, 527 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2008), 29 ENERGY L.J. 695, 702 (2008) (concluding that deference to states’ 
coastal-zone-management plans enables states to block construction of LNG terminals); Public Concerns, FED. 
ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, http://ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng/public.asp (last updated June 28, 2010) 
(describing reasons for controversy surrounding proposed LNG terminals). 
 121 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 292–93 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 94 (1995), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 61). 
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divide using what I have previously described as “process preemption” to 
streamline the telecommunications-siting and permitting process.122 In a 
process-preemption regime, Congress imposes baseline federal requirements 
on the local siting process.123 Within the federal framework, local officials 
retain substantial discretion to shape and customize the broad federal policy 
guidelines in response to community preferences.124 
Prior to the passage of the Telecommunications Siting Policy, inconsistent 
local permitting processes and strong local opposition significantly delayed 
and often prevented cell-phone-tower siting.125 Recognizing the importance of 
developing a nationwide telecommunications network, the House of 
Representatives first considered granting the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) exclusive siting authority over telecommunications towers. 
The House Facilities Siting Policies called for the FCC to establish a 
negotiated rule-making committee to develop substantive policies related to 
wireless-facilities siting that would consider both the national interest in 
enhancing coverage and the legitimate interests of state and local governments 
in regulating the use of land within their own borders.126 Like the EPAct, this 
proposal would have entirely preempted the local land-use process, replacing 
local zoning officials with federal administrative agents. In contrast, the 
corresponding Senate bill would have left siting authority exclusively under 
the control of local authorities.127 
The House–Senate conference committee adopted a compromise, enacting 
a Telecommunications Siting Policy that imposes federal constraints on the 
siting process but leaves primary siting authority in the hands of local 
regulators.128 The Siting Policy, thus, allows local regulators to tailor the 
policy to local conditions and to experiment with siting standards and 
 
 122 Ostrow, supra note 2. 
 123 Id. at 289. 
 124 According to the conference committee report, “The conference agreement creates a new section 704 
which prevents Commission preemption of local and State land use decisions and preserves the authority of 
State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except in the limited circumstances set forth in 
the conference agreement.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 207–08 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 125 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 317. 
 126 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. 1, at 25. 
 127 See S. 652, 104th Cong. (1996) (making no mention of telecommunications siting). See generally 
Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 697–98 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (noting 
the difference between the House version, which would have empowered the FCC to directly regulate the 
siting of towers, and the Senate version, which would have allowed local zoning officials to retain that 
authority). 
 128 Ostrow, supra note 2, at 318. 
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strategies.129 Procedurally, the Telecommunications Siting Policy requires that 
local governments respond to any siting application “within a reasonable 
period of time”130 and that a local government decision to deny a permit “be in 
writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”131  
Under the Telecommunications Siting Policy, state and local governments 
retain almost complete authority over the substance of local zoning codes. The 
Siting Policy imposes three substantive constraints on local decision making, 
preempting local siting decisions that “unreasonably discriminate among 
providers of functionally equivalent services,”132 “prohibit[] the provision of 
personal wireless services,”133 or vary from FCC regulations governing radio-
frequency emissions.134 Though siting decisions must be supported by 
“substantial evidence contained in a written record,” the decision itself is made 
in accordance with substantive state and local law.135 In essence, the 
Telecommunications Siting Policy sets out the degree of evidence needed to 
support the zoning decision but does not dictate what type of evidence must be 
considered.136  
As an empirical matter, the TCA’s process-preemption regime has been a 
success; since 1996, the number of cell phone towers sited across the country 
has increased exponentially.137 The sophisticated national telecommunications 
network stands in stark contrast to the antiquated and inadequate energy-
transmission grid. Yet many questions remain unanswered. Indeed, the 
questions have yet to be asked: How does the siting policy work? Why does it 
work? What are the costs and benefits of this regulatory framework as 
 
 129 See id. at 305, 319 (describing how states can experiment with cell-tower siting within the confines of 
the Telecommunications Siting Policy). 
 130 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 704(a), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 131 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). 
 132 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I)–(II). 
 133 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
 134 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). 
 135 See Eagle, supra note 79, at 477 (“[F]ederal law specifies the degree or quantum of evidence needed to 
legitimize, under federal law, the exercise of legislative powers devolved upon local boards, under state law, to 
enforce substantive rights established by state law.”); see also Susan Lorde Martin, Wind Farms and NIMBYs: 
Generating Conflict, Reducing Litigation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 427, 433–34 (2010) (citing cases 
holding that substantial evidence must be based on existing state and local law). 
 136 See USCOC of Greater Mo. v. City of Ferguson, 583 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 2009); T-Mobile Cent., 
LLC v. Unified Gov’t, 546 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2008); U.S. Cellular Tel., L.L.C. v. City of Broken 
Arrow, 340 F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir. 2003); New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns Enters., 173 F.3d 9, 14–16 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 137 Ostrow, supra note 2, at 293. 
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compared with alternative strategies? The next Part considers these 
foundational questions to develop a theory of land law federalism. 
II. FEDERAL LAND LAW: OF MONEY AND POWER 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of local control, modern land-use law 
involves a significant, though poorly understood, national dimension. Given 
the variation in form and substance, it might appear, as others have observed, 
that the federal patchwork lacks internal coherence or underlying logic.138 This 
Part argues that the disparate strands of federal land law are, in fact, bound 
together by a common objective—to account for the cumulative impact of 
local land-use decisions. In this way, federal land laws counterbalance the 
development that would result from unfettered local control. 
To differentiate between various modes of federal regulation, this Part 
categorizes federal land laws along substantive and procedural axes. 
Substantively, federal laws can be classified as (1) pro-development, 
subsidizing land use that would be overly restricted by local governments, or 
(2) anti-development, restricting land use that would be excessively permitted 
by local governments. Procedurally, federal land laws are implemented either 
(1) directly, by a federal administrative agency, or (2) indirectly, by local 
officials serving as federal agents. 
The notion that nonfederal regulators can, and do, implement federal law is 
not new.139 Under the Supreme Court’s commandeering doctrine, as developed 
in New York v. United States140 and Printz v. United States,141 “[t]he Federal 
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address 
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their 
political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”142 
 
 138 See supra notes 15–17. 
 139 See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of 
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 565–66 (2011) (using legislation theory to 
analyze the varying roles that state actors play in implementing federal statutes); Hills, supra note 24, at 815 
(analyzing the utility to the federal government of enlisting state actors to accomplish federal objectives); Erin 
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2011) (describing state and local implementation of 
federal policy). 
 140 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 141 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 142 Id. at 935. To be sure, the boundaries of the commandeering doctrine are murky. In Reno v. Condon, 
528 U.S. 141 (2000), the Court held that a federal statute that prohibited state motor vehicle departments from 
selling drivers’ personal information did not commandeer state officials. As other scholars have noted, it is not 
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Congress, however, may offer incentives—financial and regulatory—to 
persuade states to legislate in accordance with federal interests.143 
Traditionally, these mechanisms have been called “cooperative,” although 
commentators have long noted the noncooperative, or coercive, elements of 
these regimes.144 As Professor Roderick Hills first observed: 
There are two mechanisms by which non-federal 
governments become the agencies of the Congress: first, the 
Congress can hire state and local officials with federal grants-in-
aid, and, second, the federal government can allow state or local 
law to displace federal regulation that would otherwise preempt 
such non-federal law if the non-federal law meets the standards 
established by Congress.145 
To avoid commandeering concerns, federal policies that are implemented 
directly by local officials rely upon conditional spending (money) and/or 
conditional preemption (power) to encourage local land-use regulators to 
implement federal law.146 Moreover, federal land laws utilize two distinct 
forms of conditional preemption. The first, which I label the “federal-
regulation model,” encourages local implementation by threatening to replace 
 
clear why “[s]tate authority implicated in performing a background check on state citizens is protected, but 
state authority implicated in gathering and reporting information about state citizens (e.g., missing children to 
the federal government, or drivers’ information to willing buyers) is not.” Ryan, supra note 27, at 548; accord 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: A Rebuttal to Dr. Greve, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 91, 93–94 (2005). 
 143 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–69; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal 
Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1204 n.12 
(1999) (describing cooperative federalism as “intergovernmental cooperation . . . under which nonfederal 
officials implement federal policy”). 
 144 See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 385; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, 
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1284–91 (2009) (exploring the potential benefits of 
uncooperative state regimes).  
 145 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 184 
(1998). Professor Hills also notes that “Congress may allow non-federal governments to enforce its regulations 
only if they meet federal standards, and Congress may encourage non-federal governments to submit 
implementation plans by subsidizing the cost of implementation with federal grants.” Id.  
 146 New York, 505 U.S. at 176. In New York, New York State challenged a provision of the Low Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act that required states to either (1) regulate low-level radioactive waste according 
to federal standards or (2) take title to and assume liability for waste produced within the state’s borders. Id. at 
174–75. The Court determined that Congress lacked the power to enact either of these options as mandatory, 
independent legislation and therefore could not force the states to choose between the two, noting that a 
“choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.” Id. at 176. The 
Court, therefore, struck down the take-title provision for “commandeer[ing]” the state regulatory apparatus in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 175–77. 
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state law with federal law.147 The second form, which I call the “market-
alternative model,” encourages local implementation by threatening to leave 
the area unregulated, subject only to the free market.148 
There are a variety of reasons why Congress chooses to regulate through 
the states, rather than regulating directly.149 Perhaps the most basic is as 
Professor Erin Ryan explains: “Congress creates programs of cooperative 
federalism in commerce-related realms it could manage from top to bottom—
but chooses not to, because the federal government lacks the local expertise, 
regulatory authority, boots on the ground, or perceived legitimacy—in short, 
the capacity—that state government can provide.”150 
At the outset of this undertaking, a disclaimer is in order. This Part 
develops a theoretical framework for federal land law. I do not propose a 
single model or advocate the adoption of a comprehensive national land-use 
policy along the lines of the failed NLUPA.151 The first is impossible for 
practical reasons—by its very nature, land resists generalization.152 The second 
is unlikely for political reasons. As Congress’s failure to pass climate change 
legislation reveals, there is little political support for centralization through 
federal legislation.153 Instead, this Part is my initial foray into the theory of 
land law federalism. 
 
 147 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (allowing states to submit 
national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) regulatory plans for federal approval but preempting 
states with federal enforcement of NPDES regulations in the event of state refusal to submit a plan); Clean Air 
Act § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407, 7409 (2006) (inviting states to enforce national ambient-air-quality standards 
through state implementation plans but providing for federal implementation plans). 
 148 See Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 703–04 (4th Cir. 2000) (per 
curiam) (characterizing the Telecommunications Act as presenting the states with a choice between regulating 
cell-phone-tower siting in accordance with federal standards or ceasing all regulation of cell-phone-tower 
siting); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 (1982) (upholding the use of conditional preemption 
even where Congress “fail[s] to provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of 
state default” (emphasis added)). 
 149 See Gluck, supra note 139, at 565 (summarizing strategic and functional reasons for federal reliance on 
state implementation of federal programs). 
 150 Ryan, supra note 139, at 90. 
 151 See supra notes 44–47. 
 152 See infra Part III.C. 
 153 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (passing the House 
with a vote of 219 to 212 but failing to reach a vote in the Senate); Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The 
Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 
437 (2011) (criticizing the EPA for only regulating carbon emissions from sources deemed “politically acceptable”); 
Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking and the 
States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 54–59 (2011) (analyzing state and federal resistance to centralization through 
comprehensive climate change and energy legislation). 
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A. Federal Implementation 
1. Federal Permitting Schemes 
Federal permitting requirements restrict the development of privately 
owned property, including wetlands and endangered species habitats. For 
example, section 404 of the CWA requires landowners to obtain federal 
permits from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to discharge dredge and fill 
materials into “waters of the United States.”154 The regulations state that 
“[m]ost wetlands constitute a productive and valuable public resource, the 
unnecessary alteration or destruction of which should be discouraged as 
contrary to the public interest.”155 
Section 9 of the ESA similarly prohibits activities affecting protected 
species and their habitats, even if privately owned, unless authorized by a 
permit from the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration.156 To obtain a permit under the ESA, landowners 
and developers must prepare habitat-conservation plans that fully describe 
proposed land-development activities and demonstrate measures that will 
mitigate their adverse impact on endangered or threatened species.157 
Federal permitting schemes are generally effective at preventing undesired 
development;158 however, critics argue that single-purpose federal agencies are 
overly zealous in administering the schemes, restricting even socially 
beneficial development,159 and that direct federal regulation intrudes upon 
 
 154 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, sec. 2, § 404, 86 Stat. 
816, 884 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006)); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable 
waters” as “waters of the United States”); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2011). 
 155 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(1). 
 156 Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 9, 87 Stat. 884, 893 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1538); see also Adler, 
Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 383. 
 157 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 158 See OFFICE OF WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER PROGRAM: BEST PRACTICES AND END 
OF YEAR PERFORMANCE REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 85 (2012) (finding that the EPA met its goals for 2011, 
achieving no net loss of wetlands, and that the EPA had exceeded its commitment on number of acres restored in 
every year since 2004); Martin F.J. Taylor et al., The Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act: A Quantitative 
Analysis, 55 BIOSCIENCE 360 (2005) (analyzing the effectiveness of the ESA and finding positive correlation 
between protection under the ESA and increasing population of endangered species). 
 159 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Endangered Species Act Lessons over 30 Years, and the Legacy of the Snail 
Darter, a Small Fish in a Pork Barrel, 34 ENVTL. L. 289, 302–03 (2004) (noting that opponents of the ESA 
have claimed that it harms “human economic welfare” by restraining development); J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) 
of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal 
Agencies’ Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1137–39 (1995) (describing objections of property 
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local autonomy.160 Unlike locally elected officials, federal administrators are 
not politically accountable to the local community and therefore have less 
incentive to take local preferences into consideration. Thus, even where federal 
programs enable federal regulators to modify uniform rules through case-by-
case permitting schemes, as under the CWA and the ESA, “vast geographical 
and metaphorical distances separate Washington bureaucrats from the local 
contexts in which land-use decisions are typically made, and where their 
consequences, at least on the cost side, are most keenly felt.”161 
2. Federal Siting Regimes 
In contrast to federal permitting schemes, which intentionally restrict 
development, federal siting regimes promote growth by subsidizing the 
development of specific land uses. Several federal siting regimes preempt the 
local zoning process and vest siting authority exclusively in a federal 
administrative agency. For example, the EPAct grants FERC exclusive 
authority to site LNG terminals.162 Despite this authority, commentators 
observe that state and local actors continue to resist LNG siting, using 
litigation and drawn-out permitting processes to delay or prevent the 
development of these facilities.163 
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982164 (NWPA), perhaps the poster 
child for a failed federal land-use policy, similarly preempts the local zoning 
process. The NWPA, as amended, charged the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission with licensing a single national repository for high-level 
 
rights advocates to the ESA and the CWA); David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of 
Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 
42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 79–80 (2002) (discussing changes to the federal wetland-permitting process and 
projecting higher costs for private developers that could make some projects economically infeasible). 
 160 See Pedersen, supra note 31, at 21–23 (identifying political opposition to federal attempts to shape 
local land use through the CWA and the ESA). 
 161 Karkkainen, supra note 19, at 80; accord Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218 (noting intense conflict over 
land use at local levels because burdens of use are felt most directly by those living near the land); Hills & 
Schleicher, supra note 84 (manuscript at 10) (“[L]and use disputes involve geographically concentrated harms 
and widely geographically dispersed benefits . . . .”); Ostrow, supra note 2, at 297; Rose, supra note 4, at 911 
(suggesting that land-use decisions are made at the local level, in part, because these decisions are felt most 
deeply within the neighborhood). 
 162 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 311(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. 717b(e)(1). 
 163 See supra note 117–20. 
 164 Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270). 
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radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.165 From the outset, the Yucca 
Mountain project faced intense state and local opposition.166 In 2009, nearly 
two decades after the site was selected and billions had been spent studying it, 
the Department of Energy terminated its plans for the Yucca Mountain 
project.167 
Because the sample size is so small, and the targeted land use so 
unavoidably risky, it is difficult to generalize from the federal experience siting 
LNG terminals and hazardous-waste facilities to other land-use facilities. It is 
quite possible that federal administrative agencies have the capacity to site less 
hazardous facilities more effectively. Nonetheless, in comparison to the 
alternative local-official-as-federal-agent approach, federal implementation is 
likely to be more costly and to produce less optimal results. Section B turns to 
the local-official-as-federal-agent alternative. 
B. Local Implementation 
1. Conditional Funding 
When Congress seeks to encourage a state to legislate in accordance with 
national interests, it may, under its spending power, condition federal funding 
upon cooperation with the national program.168 Although there is a point at 
which conditional funding becomes coercive, in South Dakota v. Dole, the 
Supreme Court embraced an expansive understanding of Congress’s spending 
power, noting that the Spending Clause empowers Congress to impose 
conditions on the use of federal funds “to further broad policy objectives by 
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with 
federal statutory and administrative directives.”169 
 
 165 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 § 113(a), 42 U.S.C. § 10133(a); Richard C. Kearney, Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Management: Environmental Policy, Federalism, and New York, PUBLIUS, Summer 1993, 
at 57, 59–60. 
 166 See Marta Adams, Yucca Mountain—Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 423, 438–42 (2010) 
(describing the controversy in Nevada and the delays caused by scientific and environmental studies, and 
judicial and administrative challenges); Kearney, supra note 165, at 60 (describing the contentious siting 
process at Yucca Mountain). 
 167 Ostrow, supra note 2, at 310–12. 
 168 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166–68 (1992); Hills, supra note 145, at 184. 
 169 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (plurality 
opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some scholars have urged the Court to impose stricter limits on 
congressional power under the Spending Clause. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off 
the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could 
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 483–85 (2003). 
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Conditional funding does not commandeer state officials because states can 
opt out of the funding program and refuse to follow federal directives. 
Professor Buzbee explains that, “[w]hen a variety of targeted grants or 
subsidies are available or vulnerable to loss, states and local governments can 
seek the particular array of programmatic supports that best meet a 
jurisdiction’s interests.”170 Importantly, while conditional spending seeks to 
guide state and local decision making, the decision-making authority itself 
remains in the hands of local regulators. Thus, conditional spending schemes 
leave state and local governments with significantly more discretion than 
would be the case if the federal government regulated land directly. 
Federal grants and spending programs have been used to promote local 
development in accordance with national environmental, economic, and 
welfare policy goals. For example, federal transportation policies require state 
and local officials to engage in land-use planning as a condition to receipt of 
federal highway funds.171 The Clean Air Act similarly conditions federal 
highway funds upon states’ adoption of air-pollution-control plans that meet 
federal requirements.172 The CWA provides states with federal funds to 
encourage local land-use planning to prevent nonpoint-source pollution,173 
while the Coastal Barrier Resources Act denies aid for developments in 
sensitive coastal areas.174 
In addition, several federal programs bypass the states and channel funds 
directly to local political units. The federal Transportation Equity Act for the 
21st Century provides regional transportation-planning agencies with the 
authority to fund projects that reduce traffic congestion, to acquire scenic 
easements, and to create bicycle trails.175 Federal housing programs provide 
substantial subsidies to special local government agencies, called housing 
 
 170 Buzbee, supra note 73, at 108. 
 171 See 23 U.S.C. § 134(i)(4)(A) (2006) (requiring metropolitan-planning organizations to consult with 
state and local land-use agencies to develop long-range transportation plans). As Professor John Nolon has 
observed, “The enigma embodied in this requirement is easily described: it requires regional transportation 
agencies to achieve consistency with land use plans that are predominantly local in nature and not consistent 
with one another at the regional level.” Nolon, supra note 4, at 368 n.14. 
 172 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 sec. 129(b), § 176(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1); see also Adler, 
Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 436–37 (noting that the tenuous connection between highway funds and 
the Clean Air Act makes this provision vulnerable to federalism challenges under the Spending Clause). 
 173 Clean Water Act § 317(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(1). 
 174 Coastal Barrier Resources Act § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 3501(b). 
 175 Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.). 
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authorities, to enable these authorities to develop and manage housing projects 
with below-market rent.176  
Although the early federal housing projects had mixed results,177 
subsequent federal policies aimed at developing mixed-income communities178 
and included funding for the development of regional and local land-use 
plans.179 Federal funding for regional land-use planning declined in the 
1980s180 but was revived in 2009 with the formation of the Partnership for 
Sustainable Communities, an interagency partnership between the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (DOT), and the EPA.181 The Partnership coordinates a host 
of discretionary grant programs,182 including the Sustainable Communities 
Initiative, which supports “regional planning efforts that integrate housing and 
transportation decisions, and increase the capacity of communities to 
modernize land use and zoning plans.”183 
 
 176 See, e.g., United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1437–1437f); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing 
Project, 57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 989–90 (2010); Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing 
Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 894–99 (1990). 
 177 See Ellickson, supra note 176, at 989–95; Green, supra note 9, at 91–92. 
 178 For example, the section 8 voucher program was designed to allow low-income families to obtain 
housing on the open market. United States Housing Act of 1937 § 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. HOPE VI aimed at 
inducing local housing authorities to replace failed public-housing projects with mixed-income developments, 
see Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-389, tit. II, 106 Stat. 1571, 1579 (1992), and recent legislation 
required local housing authorities to rent more public-housing units to households whose incomes were not 
extremely low, see Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 513(a), 112 
Stat. 2461, 2544–45 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(a)(3)). 
 179 See MARK SOLOF, N. JERSEY TRANSP. PLANNING AUTH., INC., HISTORY OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING 
ORGANIZATIONS 17 (1998), available at http://www.njtpa.org/Pub/Report/hist_mpo/documents/MPO 
history1998.pdf (summarizing federal legislation that conditioned federal funding on regional planning). 
 180 Id. at 26. 
 181 The Partnership defines “sustainable communities” as “places that have a variety of housing and 
transportation choices, with destinations close to home.” Sustainable Communities, PARTNERSHIP FOR 
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
 182 See Partnership Grants, Assistance & Programs, PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, 
http://www.sustainablecommunities.gov/grants.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (listing federal grants and 
programs for sustainable communities offered by the Partnership as well as individually by HUD, the DOT, 
and the EPA). 
 183 See DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY (NOFA) FOR HUD’S FISCAL 
YEAR 2011: SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM 1 (2011), available at http:// 
archives.hud.gov/funding/2011/scrpgprenofa.pdf. 
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Another interesting example of conditional funding is in the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA).184 Unlike other environmental laws that 
threaten noncompliant states with federal preemption, the CZMA is entirely 
voluntary.185 The CZMA provides states with two sets of incentives to 
encourage them to develop comprehensive coastal-management programs that 
meet federal approval standards: (a) federal funding and (b) regulatory 
authority over their coastal zones, including the authority to ensure that federal 
projects are consistent with the states’ plans.186 The CZMA recognizes the 
traditional role that local officials play in administering land-use regulations 
and requires states to create a regulatory framework that assures “the full 
participation of those local governments and agencies” in implementing the 
Act.187 Moreover, the federal standards are broadly drawn, leaving states with 
substantial discretion to tailor the particular coastal-protection measures they 
adopt.188 Although weaknesses in the evaluation process have made it difficult 
to assess the CZMA’s effectiveness,189 nearly every coastal state has adopted a 
plan in compliance with federal standards.190 
2. Conditional Preemption 
In addition to the carrot of federal funding, federal land laws often include 
the stick of conditional preemption.191 Conditional preemption requires the 
 
 184 Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1451–1466 (2006)). 
 185 See Buzbee, supra note 73, at 110 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(1)). 
 186 Ryan, supra note 139, at 59–60; see also 136 CONG. REC. 26,030, 26,030–67 (1990) (statement of 
Rep. Walter B. Jones); Buzbee, supra note 73, at 111 (noting that the CZMA provides regulatory and financial 
“incentives to direct development in ways avoiding environmental harms, yet without requiring any federal 
displacement of local choices”). 
 187 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(3)(B). 
 188 Id. See generally NAT’L OCEAN SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CZMA SECTION 312 EVALUATION 
SUMMARY REPORT—2006 (2007), available at http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/success/media/ 
312summaryreport2006.pdf (identifying challenges for state coastal-management programs and encouraging 
information exchange). 
 189 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1045, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT: MEASURING 
PROGRAM’S EFFECTIVENESS CONTINUES TO BE A CHALLENGE 7 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/290/280782.pdf. 
 190 See Ryan, supra note 139, at 59 (“Thirty-four of thirty-five eligible states have approved coastal-
management plans, and Illinois, the remaining state, is presently composing a plan.”); see also OFFICE OF 
OCEAN & COASTAL RES. MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, UPDATE ON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM, at ii (2006), available at http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/ 
resources/docs/npmsupdate.pdf. 
 191 See Hills, supra note 145, at 184; Hills, supra note 24, at 867 (“[P]rograms for conditional preemption 
resemble programs for project grants; rather than presenting every state with the same package of conditions 
and benefits, Congress establishes a set of criteria that each state might be able to meet in a different manner 
by individually applying to a Federal agency for approval of its implementation plan.”); Philip J. Weiser, 
OSTROW GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:34 PM 
1430 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1397 
states to cooperate in implementing the federal program or be preempted by 
the federal government.192 In New York v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from imposing some 
affirmative duties on nonfederal officials.193 At the same time, however, the 
Court maintained that, so long as Congress is authorized under the Commerce 
Clause to preempt state regulation entirely, it may require states to choose 
between regulating in accordance with federal standards and having their 
nonconforming regulations preempted by federal law.194 
The consequences of refusing to implement the cooperative program, 
however, vary depending on the form of conditional preemption Congress 
uses. This section identifies two forms of conditional preemption that appear in 
federal land law: the federal-regulation model and the market-alternative 
model. The federal-regulation model of conditional preemption presents states 
with the following choice: regulate in accordance with federal standards or the 
federal government will regulate directly.195 In contrast, the market-alternative 
model tells states: regulate in accordance with federal standards or do not 
regulate at all. Congress does not threaten to replace local officials with federal 
agents. Instead, Congress threatens to leave the field unregulated.196 
The federal-regulation model appears in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
& Reclamation Ass’n.197 In Hodel, the Court upheld a provision of the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977198 (SMCRA) that required mine 
operators to restore certain land to its pre-mining condition.199 In essence, the 
 
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 668 (2001) (noting 
that, through conditional preemption, “Congress either allows states to regulate in compliance with federal 
standards or preempts state law with federal regulation”). 
 192 Davis, supra note 118, at 405; Weiser, supra note 191, at 668. See generally New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (providing examples of conditional preemption, including the CWA, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, and the 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act). 
 193 See New York, 505 U.S. at 174–75; see also supra note 142. 
 194 See id. at 173–74. 
 195 Davis, supra note 118, at 405. 
 196 See id. at 405–06 & n.12 (identifying proposals for eliminating conditional-preemption schemes that 
do not provide an alternative federal regulatory scheme); see also Hills, supra note 24, at 926 (criticizing the 
Court’s acceptance of PURPA, which failed to provide a federal regulatory alternative for states that refused to 
comply); Jared O’Connor, Note, National League of Cities Rising: How the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Could Expand Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 315, 346–47 (2003) (describing 
the use of conditional preemption in the Telecommunications Act). 
 197 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
 198 Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328 (2006)). 
 199 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268. 
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SMCRA told the states: regulate pursuant to our requirements or we will 
regulate surface mining ourselves.200 Despite the tradition of localism in land-
use law, the Court upheld this use of conditional preemption to invalidate 
inconsistent state policies.201 
In FERC v. Mississippi, decided one year after Hodel, the Court upheld the 
market-alternative model.202 PURPA, which was at issue in FERC, required 
states to consider federal standards for regulating utilities. In contrast to the 
SMCRA, however, the federal government did not provide alternative federal 
regulations for states that chose not to comply. The Court acknowledged the 
dilemma created by this form of conditional preemption, stating: 
We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the States—that of 
either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or considering 
the federal standards—may be a difficult one. And that is 
particularly true when Congress, as is the case here, has failed to 
provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in 
the event of state default.203 
Nevertheless, the Court determined that Congress may require states to choose 
between regulating in accordance with federal standards or leaving the field 
unregulated, subject only to the free market.204 
a. The Federal-Regulation Model 
A number of environmental laws utilize the federal-regulation model of 
conditional preemption to persuade local officials to administer a federal 
regulatory program. In general, environmental laws restrict or regulate the use 
of land so as to protect natural resources or reduce pollution. Because the 
purpose of these statutes is to restrict development, Congress first offers states 
the opportunity to comply with federal restrictions and then provides 
alternative federal regulations should states refuse to cooperate. Regardless of 
which option a state chooses, the federal purpose is accomplished—
 
 200 See id. at 270–72; see also Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 37, at 431 (describing the SMCRA 
as offering states the alternative of federal regulation if they do not wish to regulate in accordance with the 
federal scheme). 
 201 See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) (noting that Hodel upheld SMCRA’s land-use 
regulations although “regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity”). 
 202 Id. at 766. 
 203 Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 715 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 
(quoting FERC, 456 U.S. at 766). 
 204 See FERC, 456 U.S. at 766. 
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development will be restricted either by states complying with federal 
requirements or by the federal regulatory alternative. 
The Clean Air Act, for example, incentivizes state implementation of 
federally imposed standards by threatening to replace state plans and local 
discretion with federal plans.205 The Act affords state and local regulators 
substantial discretion to allocate criteria pollutants, thus enabling local officials 
to tailor patterns of development, building codes, public transportation, 
farming practices, and wetland drainage to meet federal pollution-emission 
standards.206 Yet, if a state fails to complete a plan that complies with all 
requirements of the Act, the federal government may step in and implement a 
federal plan.207 Under either scenario, air pollution will be regulated. 
The CWA’s Stormwater Phase II Rule, which regulates the storm-water 
discharges of small municipalities, provides another example of this form of 
conditional preemption.208 Under the Phase II Rule, municipalities must 
develop individually tailored storm-water-management programs that meet six 
minimum federal criteria or submit to a more complex federal permitting 
process.209 The Ninth Circuit sustained the Phase II Rule against a Tenth 
Amendment challenge because the Phase II Rule gave municipal operators a 
choice: implement the regulatory program required by the Phase II Rule or 
become subject to a federal permitting scheme.210 Here, too, the national 
objective is achieved—water pollution is regulated regardless of an individual 
municipality’s choice. 
 
 205 See supra notes 48–51. 
 206 See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 36, at 828. 
 207 Clean Air Act § 110(c), 42 U.S.C § 7410(c) (2006). 
 208 40 C.F.R. § 122.34 (2011). See generally John H. Minan, Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System 
(MS4) Regulation Under the Federal Clean Water Act: The Role of Water Quality Standards?, 42 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1215 (2005) (providing an overview of the CWA’s municipal-storm-water regulations); Ryan, supra 
note 139, at 56 (noting that the regulation of municipal storm water sits “vexingly at the crossroad between 
land uses regulated locally and water pollution regulated federally”). 
 209 40 C.F.R. § 122.34. Specifically, the municipal program must contain the following elements: (1) 
public education and outreach on storm-water impacts, (2) public involvement/participation, (3) illicit-
discharge detection and elimination, (4) construction site storm-water-runoff control, (5) post-construction 
storm-water management in new development and redevelopment, and (6) pollution prevention/good 
housekeeping for municipal operations. Id. 
 210 See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 847 (9th Cir. 2003) (“With the Phase II Rule, EPA 
gave the operators of small MS4s a choice: either implement the regulatory program spelled out by the 
Minimum Measures described at 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b), or pursue the Alternative Permit option and seek a 
permit under the Phase I Rule as described at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(d).”). 
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b. The Market-Alternative Model 
In contrast, under the market-alternative model of conditional preemption, 
local officials must regulate in accordance with federal standards or leave the 
substantive area unregulated and subject only to the free market. In essence, 
Congress permits states to regulate the protected land use so long as states 
comply with the federal standards. If states refuse to comply, Congress is 
content to leave the area unregulated, assuming that the free market will 
produce at least as much, and likely more, of the desired land use. 
Several federal siting regimes utilize the market-alternative model. Federal 
siting regimes are designed to promote land use, albeit a particular type of land 
use. For example, the Telecommunications Siting Policy is expressly designed 
to streamline the local land-use-permitting process so as to facilitate the rapid 
deployment of a national telecommunications network.211 To that end, the 
Telecommunications Siting Policy establishes threshold federal requirements 
for cell-phone-tower siting.212 State and local land-use regulators must comply 
with these federal requirements or refrain from regulating the siting of cell 
phone towers entirely.213 As the Fourth Circuit explained in considering a 
Tenth Amendment challenge to the Telecommunications Siting Policy, 
“Because Congress could validly prohibit states from regulating the siting of 
telecommunications towers, it may constitutionally offer states a choice 
between (1) being subject to such a prohibition or (2) processing permit 
applications for communications towers in accordance with [federal 
standards].”214 
RLUIPA presents localities with a similar option in regulating religious 
land uses. RLUIPA is intended to protect religious land use in the zoning 
process.215 RLUIPA, thus, prohibits local governments from “implement[ing] a 
land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person . . . unless the government demonstrates that [the 
regulation] . . . (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
 
 211 See supra Part I.C.2.b. 
 212 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 704(a), 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)–(iii). 
 213 See id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (giving the right to sue to persons adversely affected by an action of a state 
government that is inconsistent with the statute’s limitations). 
 214 Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 715 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
 215 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.   
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interest.”216 Zoning boards must comply with the federal requirements or leave 
religious land use unregulated. 
*  *  * 
Of course, the choice presented to local governments—regulate in 
accordance with federal standards or abandon zoning—is largely illusory. No 
local government would choose to entirely relinquish its land-use regulatory 
authority, even over a limited category of land uses, such as cell phone towers, 
group homes for the disabled, or churches. Indeed, Judge Niemeyer, the only 
judge to have determined that the Telecommunications Siting Policy 
“commandeer[ed]” local officials in violation of the Tenth Amendment, 
emphasized the coerciveness of this “choice” in light of the importance of 
land-use regulation to local governments.217 According to Judge Niemeyer: 
To suggest that a local governmental body withdraw from land-
use regulation and leave the construction of structures in the 
community to the whims of the market is nothing short of 
suggesting that it end its existence in one of its most vital aspects. 
. . . If a state, county, or town abandoned its local land-use 
power to regulate the siting of communications facilities, any 
number of telecommunications towers and other communications 
facilities could be erected in the midst of residential 
neighborhoods, next to schools, or in bucolic natural settings such 
as in the woods or on top of mountains—areas held in high value 
by most communities. Abandoning land use power in this way 
would put at risk the property value of every home in the 
jurisdiction and create the possibility that aesthetic quality of 
every area in the jurisdiction would be destroyed.218 
In contrast to Judge Niemeyer, most courts have concluded that requiring land-
use authorities to regulate in accordance with federal standards does not 
commandeer state officials.219 Moreover, this Article maintains that, in some 
 
 216 Id. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 217 Petersburg Cellular P’ship, 205 F.3d at 699–705 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
175 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Niemeyer concluded that the Telecommunications 
Siting Policy violates the Tenth Amendment because “[t]he abandonment of land use control for towers is not 
a viable option for state and local governments.” Id. at 703; accord Clive B. Jacques & Jack M. Beermann, 
Section 1983’s “and Laws” Clause Run Amok: Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees in Cellular Facilities Siting 
Disputes, 81 B.U. L. REV. 735, 779 (2001) (arguing that the Telecommunications Act’s cellular-tower-siting 
provisions commandeer state agents in violation of the Tenth Amendment). 
 218 Petersburg Cellular P’ship, 205 F.3d at 703. 
 219 See, e.g., Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) complies with the Tenth Amendment both facially and as applied); New Cingular Wireless 
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instances, local governments should be “coerced” into considering the broader 
implications of their local land-use decisions.220 To that end, the next Part 
introduces a local-official-as-federal-agent model that permits the federal 
government to establish standards that promote the national welfare without 
sacrificing the many benefits of decentralized governance.221 
III.  LOCAL OFFICIALS AS FEDERAL AGENTS 
Having established a normative and doctrinal justification for the use of 
federal law to address cumulative land-use problems in Part I and investigated 
the mechanics of federal land law in Part II, this Part considers the most basic 
question of federalism; namely, how should land-use regulatory authority be 
allocated between the national government and its subnational units?222 
To answer this question, this Part assesses the comparative regulatory 
capacity at each level of government—federal, state, and local—to address 
 
PCS, LLC v. City of Cambridge, No. 10-11541-NMG, 2011 WL 6755835 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2011) (holding 
that the substantial-evidence requirement passes muster under the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Maui 
County, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1015–16 (D. Haw. 2003) (finding similarity between RLUIPA and the TCA in 
that both are valid despite the fact that they intrude on some local land-use decisions); USOC of Greater Iowa, 
Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1087 (D. Neb. 2003) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge 
to the “in writing” and “substantial evidence” requirements of the TCA); SBA Commc’ns, Inc. v. Zoning 
Comm’n, 164 F. Supp. 2d 280, 289 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that the substantial-evidence standard does not 
violate the Tenth Amendment); Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Huntsville, No. CV-99-B-2933-NE, 2000 WL 
34017802, at *34 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2000) (holding that the TCA does not violate the Tenth Amendment). 
The fact that the Telecommunications Siting Policy blends substantive and procedural constraints does not 
impact this analysis. As the Supreme Court held in FERC, “If Congress can require a state administrative body 
to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field—and we 
hold today that it can—there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress’ requiring certain procedural minima 
as that body goes about undertaking its tasks.” FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 771 (1982). 
 220 Accord Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling 
Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
579, 608 (2008) (arguing that ceiling preemption is a proper response to NIMBYism); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 166, 176 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 
2007) (“NIMBY laws present a classic example of the prisoners’ dilemma: everyone has an incentive to export 
the costs of an activity [such as a locally undesirable land use], but if everyone pursues this strategy, the 
benefits associated with the activity are lost to all.”); Ostrow, supra note 2, at 324 (noting that, absent a federal 
policy compelling local decision makers to consider the broader implications of their decisions, they are often 
unwilling to do so). 
 221 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 324–25. 
 222 See supra note 25. 
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cumulative land-use problems.223 Local zoning is far too narrow in scope, and 
local governments lack the legal authority and political and economic 
incentives to consider the cumulative impact of local decisions and respond 
accordingly. At the same time, centralized federal agencies lack the detailed 
knowledge necessary to make context-specific land-use decisions.224 The very 
distance that enables the national government to establish general policies in 
furtherance of national goals prevents the federal government from efficiently 
and effectively implementing these polices at the local level, where the costs 
are concentrated.225 
This Part argues that a local-official-as-federal-agent model of land use law 
is likely to generate land-use decisions that are consistent with national policy 
goals but sensitive to the local context. Section A describes the passive role 
that states have traditionally played in land-use law. Section B illustrates the 
relative institutional capacity of the federal government to respond to 
cumulative, multijurisdictional land-use problems. Section C emphasizes the 
importance of preserving a primary role for local officials in implementing 
land-use law. Local officials who are part of the community and politically 
accountable to it are in the best position to make the types of detailed, context-
specific decisions that arise in regulating the use of land.226 
Though localities are, at least initially, created by the state, they are 
ultimately more than mere agents of the state.227 Particularly in the context of 
 
 223 “Regulatory capacity is the power to make things happen—by whatever resources or institutional 
feature enables either side to accomplish an objective that the other cannot do as well.” Ryan, supra note 139, 
at 90. 
 224 See Hills, supra note 143, at 1206 (“Congress is simply not as well-suited as the states for creating 
institutions that deliver local public goods to the residents of a state in a politically accountable and cost-
effective way.”); Selmi, supra note 4, at 616 (“Largely by highlighting its responsiveness to local conditions, 
local government has retained almost full authority over land use . . . .”). 
 225 See supra note 161. 
 226 See Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218 (“Precisely because they are local, and locally accountable, state 
and local officials bring that knowledge and orientation to implementation and enforcement.”); Freyfogle, 
supra note 5, at 580 (“Sensible land use decisions require knowledge of the land itself, in its many 
variations. . . . Local people typically know the land better than outsiders.”); Keith H. Hirokawa, Property 
Pieces in Compensation Statutes: Law’s Eulogy for Oregon’s Measure 37, 38 ENVTL. L. 1111, 1142 (2008) 
(arguing that zoning enables local governments to address issues of local concern and to “create intentional 
and organized communities”); Ostrow, supra note 2, at 296 (“[L]ocal primacy in this area of law stems from a 
practical recognition that local governments are institutionally better suited to this task than are higher levels 
of government.”). 
 227 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 91 (describing local governments as agents of the state and of the local 
community); Davidson, supra note 26, at 979–80 (describing competing accounts of local governments as 
agents of the state and as democratically accountable popular governments). 
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land use, local governments represent local communities. The Supreme Court 
set the tone in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. when it emphasized the 
municipality’s autonomous political identity separate from the state and from 
the larger region.228 When local officials implement federal land-use policies, 
they act as double agents, serving both the federal government and local 
community.229 As federal agents, local officials further national policy goals, 
but as agents of the community, local officials actively tailor broad national 
land-use policies to accommodate local geographic and economic conditions 
and community preferences. 
A. The Silent States 
Although zoning has traditionally been considered a local endeavor, the 
legal authority to regulate land derives, in the first instance, from the states’ 
police power. The states, then, are certainly the most obvious choice for 
engaging in centralized land-use planning. Yet, there are two reasons to be 
wary of relying primarily on the states to account for cumulative land-use 
problems. First, states have always retained broad discretion to modify or 
reduce local land-use authority but have generally refused to do so.230 In the 
1920s, most state legislatures expressly delegated their land-use regulatory 
authority to localities through the adoption of zoning enabling acts.231 In 1971, 
Fred Bosselman and David Callies declared the start of a “quiet revolution,”232 
in which state governments would reclaim their land-use regulatory authority 
from localities so as to address extralocal problems that exceeded the capacity 
of individual local governments.233 More than forty years later, the anticipated 
revolution has yet to materialize, and there is little reason to think that the 
 
 228 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926). 
 229 See Gerken, supra note 25, at 39–40 (analogizing sub-local officials, such as zoning board members, 
with servants and arguing that the power of the servant derives in part from serving two masters). 
 230 See Bronin, supra note 4, at 268 (“With the power to pass laws, which affect each locality, states have 
the power to reform the land use regulation system in a significant way to effect change on the wide scale, 
which the evidence suggests is necessary. Yet no state has demonstrated a willingness to change local land use 
laws to respond to the mounting evidence against conventional construction.”). 
 231 Griffith, supra note 6, at 523; Ostrow, supra note 2, at 728. 
 232 BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 29, at 1. 
 233 See id. at 3 (“[S]tates . . . are the only existing political entities capable of devising innovative 
techniques and governmental structures to solve problems . . . beyond the capacity of local governments acting 
alone.”). 
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states are poised to supplant local governments as the primary land-use 
regulators.234 
Second, over the next few decades, the vast amount of growth in the United 
States is predicted to be concentrated within ten megaregions, many of which 
cross state boundaries.235 Thus, as the next section explains, it is not clear that 
individual states will have the regulatory capacity to effectively coordinate 
land use, even if they were inclined to do so. 
B. A National Perspective 
Where the cumulative impact of local land-use policies generates 
substantial extralocal social and economic costs, only the federal government 
has the legal authority and the financial resources to respond at the appropriate 
scale.236 The federal government’s capacity to compel states to internalize the 
costs of their activities has historically been a key justification for federal 
environmental law.237 Indeed, as the challenge of siting nationwide 
infrastructure demonstrates, it is difficult to address interstate and interlocal 
spillovers within a decentralized regulatory system.238 In the words of Steven 
G. Calabresi, “Sometimes variety is not the spice of life; as to some items it 
may be a downright nuisance and an expensive one at that. National 
 
 234 See Bronin, supra note 4, at 232; David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Redux: How Selected Local 
Governments Have Fared, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 296–97 (2002) (“Local land use controls have not 
withered away . . . . [N]ot only have traditional land use controls such as zoning and more flexible ‘growth 
management’ plans and regulations been used, but there is a growing trend toward environmental protection at 
the local level as well.” (footnotes omitted)); Fischel, supra note 4, § 3, at 5 (“[W]ithin a few years even its 
enthusiasts had conceded that the revolution had gotten so quiet as to be inaudible.” (citation omitted)); 
Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 VA. L. REV. 929, 935–37 (2006) (describing changes in 
zoning and concluding that “states still leave the overwhelming majority of land use regulation to general-
purpose local governments”); Saxer, supra note 75, at 678 (“Th[e] shift in responsibility from local to state 
control has not yet occurred as predicted, though some scholars continue to see a trend in growth management 
programs toward greater state intervention in the local planning and implementation process.”). 
 235 See ROBERT E. LANG & DAWN DHAVALE, CENSUS REPORT NO. 05:01, BEYOND MEGALOPOLIS: 
EXPLORING AMERICA’S NEW “MEGAPOLITAN” GEOGRAPHY 12–13 (2005), available at http://america2050.org/ 
pdf/beyondmegalopolislang.pdf (identifying ten “megapolitan” areas). 
 236 See Ostrow, supra note 2, at 305–06. 
 237 See id.; Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the 
Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (presenting the classic “race-to-the-bottom” justification for federal 
environmental law). 
 238 See Christina C. Caplan, The Failure of Current Legal and Regulatory Mechanisms to Control 
Interstate Ozone Transport: The Need for New National Legislation, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 169, 201–02 (2001) 
(arguing that interstate spillovers cannot be remedied within a decentralized system); Esty, supra note 19, at 
624 (“[W]hen problems are transboundary in scope . . . decentralized enforcement breaks down entirely.”); 
Ostrow, supra note 2, at 305–06. 
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government eliminates these potential deadweight social costs with general 
gains in social utility as a result.”239 
The relative institutional capacity of the federal government to account for 
interstate spillovers will likely increase as the scale of metropolitan governance 
expands to encompass “megapolitan” regions.240 Professor Nestor Davidson 
has argued that the growth of these interstate megaregions may trigger an 
increased federal role in urban governance as these new regions turn toward 
the federal government to address complex multijurisdictional regulatory 
problems, such as climate change, urban sprawl, and the bursting of the 
subprime-mortgage bubble.241 
In addition, in the siting context, variations in local permitting processes 
inhibit the growth of nationwide infrastructure. Increased regulatory uniformity 
encourages the development of capital-intensive infrastructure by reducing 
compliance costs and creating a more predictable regulatory environment.242 
For regional or national developers, centralized review of permitting 
applications is often preferable to local jurisdiction. As one energy consultant 
explained, “State permitting is advantageous to power plant developers 
because state proceedings are removed from local electoral politics. State 
permit reviews are never simple and are always costly. . . . Still, a state 
proceeding offers a degree of time certainty and an atmosphere of fairness 
often absent at the local level.”243 
Moreover, the federal government, which is physically and metaphorically 
removed from local politics and economic constraints, has a far greater 
 
 239 Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United 
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 780 (1995). 
 240 See LANG & DHAVALE, supra note 235, at 12–13; see also, e.g., ROBERT E. LANG ET AL., METRO. 
POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, MOUNTAIN MEGAS: AMERICAS’S NEWEST METROPOLITAN PLACES AND A 
FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP TO HELP THEM PROSPER 11, 15 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
~/media/research/files/reports/2008/7/20%20mountainmegas%20sarzynski/imw_full_report.pdf (discussing 
emerging megapolitan regions in the Intermountain West). 
 241 See Nestor M. Davidson, Leaps and Bounds, 108 MICH. L. REV. 957, 969 n.46 (2010) (reviewing 
GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION (2008)); see 
also Klass & Wilson, supra note 6 (manuscript at 22) (identifying regulatory mismatch between interstate 
transmission siting subject to intrastate regulation); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 62, at 64–65 (identifying 
climate change, urban sprawl, and the bursting of the subprime-mortgage bubble as “massive problems with 
dimensions far beyond the capacity of any single agency to manage effectively”). 
 242 See Esty, supra note 19, at 619; Ostrow, supra note 2, at 307; see also Sovacool, supra note 38, at 
421–22. 
 243 Robert D. Kahn, Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting Renewable Energy Power 
Plants, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2000, at 21, 24. 
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capacity to enact policies that have substantial redistributive effects. Paul 
Peterson argues that the lessening of restrictions on the flow of capital and 
credit at the national level allows for redistributive policies that are not 
politically viable at the local level.244 Sheryll Cashin similarly argues that “the 
national legislature possesses several institutional advantages over state 
legislatures, including a captured tax base and its facility for logrolling 
arrangements that tend to equalize power between representatives of affluent 
and poor districts.”245 
In contrast, for economic and political reasons, local officials rarely compel 
their constituents to accept unpopular land-use decisions.246 Local services—
schools, police, fire protection, and sanitation, among others—are financed 
through local taxes, primarily the property tax.247 As a result, state and local 
officials are exquisitely sensitive to local property values, aiming to attract 
land uses (and users) that contribute more to the local tax base than they 
consume in services.248 As Richard Briffault observes, “Contemporary cities, 
as a rule, do not engage in innovative redistributive programs, not because they 
lack the legal authority, but rather because they fear that initiating such 
programs would cause residential and commercial taxpayers to depart.”249 
C. Local Tailoring 
Given the enormous variability of land, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for the federal government to enact uniform, substantive land-use 
 
 244 PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 183 (1981). 
 245 Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of 
State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 594 (1999). 
 246 See PETERSON, supra note 244, at 69–70 (stating that central governments are more likely to enact 
redistributive policies than are local governments). See generally MARK SCHNEIDER, THE COMPETITIVE CITY: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA (1989) (exploring political and economic incentives of suburban 
governments, focusing on the effect of competition among local governments). 
 247 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1115, 1115, 1129 (1996) (“Local boundaries are central to the raising and spending of local 
revenue. . . . The principal source of locally-raised revenue for municipalities is the property tax.”); Lehavi, 
supra note 234, at 948 & n.84 (explaining that local governments finance their expenditures mainly through 
revenue that is generated by taxes); Serkin, supra note 85, at 1646–47 (arguing that local governments are 
responsive to homeowners who “pay for local government services through property taxes and receive the 
benefit of those services in increased property values”). 
 248 See Briffault, supra note 77, at 408; Hills, supra note 143, at 1217–18. 
 249 Briffault, supra note 77, at 408; see also Cashin, supra note 245, at 594–95 (observing that the 
national government has historically “been far more interventionist than have state governments on behalf of 
both the poor and racial minorities”). 
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policies.250 The United States spans a continent and is home to deserts, 
mountains, plains, and coastal regions.251 In some areas, land has been 
intensively developed; in others, land has been preserved in its natural state.252 
Even adjacent parcels of land “can vary dramatically in their topography and 
soil characteristics, their hydrology and ecology.”253 As Justice Story explained 
in requiring specific performance of land contracts: 
The locality, character, vicinage, peculiar soil, or accommodations 
of the land generally, may give it a peculiar and special value in 
the eyes of the purchaser; and it cannot be replaced by other land 
of the same precise value, or having the same precise local 
conveniences or accommodations; and therefore a compensation 
in damages would not be adequate relief.254 
Generally, a landowner will have deliberately accumulated the parcel in its 
present form—“it can be cropped in line with the family’s resources, it can be 
divided for inheritance, or it makes aesthetic or economic sense.”255 Through 
its use, land obtains a subjective value that cannot be measured solely in 
monetary terms.256 
Thus, the substantive content of “good” land-use law can only be 
determined in the context of its location.257 Many land-use questions cannot be 
 
 250 See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
130, 136 (2005) (“The failure to take into account local environmental conditions—let alone local tastes, 
preferences, and economic conditions—leads to ‘one size fits all’ policies that fit few areas well, if at all.”); 
Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental Federalism: An Examination of Institutional 
Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 225, 225–26 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997) 
(“There is recognition that homogeneous solutions applied to heterogeneous problems often yield high costs 
and weak results.”); Karkkainen, supra note 19, at 80 (noting concerns regarding “rigidities and inefficiencies 
of sweeping, uniform federal controls on land use”); Trisolini, supra note 4, at 740 (“The variation of urban 
form renders land use inevitably local to a large degree.”). 
 251 See Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218; Peñalver, supra note 3, at 828. 
 252 Fischel, supra note 4, § 8, at 15 (noting the use of satellite imagery to provide evidence regarding the 
ratio of urbanized land to agricultural land). 
 253 Peñalver, supra note 3, at 828. 
 254 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA § 746, at 51 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1836) (footnote omitted). As sociologists John Logan 
and Harvey Molotch put it, “Every parcel of land is unique in the idiosyncratic access it provides to other 
parcels and uses, and this quality underscores the specialness of property as a commodity.” LOGAN & 
MOLOTCH, supra note 3, at 23. 
 255 Jeffry A. Frieden, Towards a Political Economy of Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 137, 141 (2000). 
 256 See Serkin, supra note 85, at 1655–56 (arguing that an account of land that focuses purely on market 
value misses the subjective value that owners place on the use of the land); see also Joseph William Singer, 
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 663–99 (1988). 
 257 See RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 419 
(rev. ed. 2004) (noting that the substance of “good” land-use practices is “informed by the geographical 
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answered in the abstract.258 Whether a parcel of land should be developed for 
residential use or preserved for open space, or whether a church should be sited 
in a commercial district depends upon the desired city form and socioeconomic 
makeup of the area. To borrow from Justice Sutherland’s analysis in Euclid: 
[T]he question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a 
building of a particular kind or for a particular use . . . is to be 
determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of 
the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection 
with the circumstances and the locality.259 
In contrast to federal bureaucrats, local officials are literally on the 
ground.260 Local officials, who are a part of the local community and are 
politically accountable to it, have the nuanced knowledge and local 
sensibilities necessary to regulate land.261 Indeed, John Dwyer similarly 
concluded in the context of the Clean Air Act: 
The practical need to tailor implementation and enforcement to 
local conditions requires decision-makers who have, in addition to 
an adequate knowledge of these conditions, a sympathetic 
orientation toward local conditions. . . . Precisely because they are 
local, and locally accountable, state and local officials bring that 
knowledge and orientation to implementation and enforcement.262 
Moreover, local implementation preserves traditional federalism values—
avoiding the undue concentration of regulatory authority in one level of 
government; fostering democratic accountability and responsiveness; and 
leaving ample room for local variation, innovation, and competition.263 Local 
 
context of the physical and socioeconomic systems in which land use operates” (emphasis omitted)); Frieden, 
supra note 255, at 141 (“Although some land is undifferentiated and standardized, the value of most land is 
highly specific to its location, owner, and its current use.”); Hirokawa, supra note 226, at 1142 (“[T]he 
propriety of particular land uses is governed by their locational context . . . .”). 
 258 See Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use 
Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 9–10 (1992) (noting the difficulty of identifying transcendent zoning values that apply 
to all land-use decisions). 
 259 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
 260 See S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 695 
(1991); see also supra note 161. 
 261 See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text 
 262 Dwyer, supra note 19, at 1218. 
 263 In the familiar words of the Court, federalism 
assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a 
heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; 
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more 
responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. 
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zoning boards are easily accessible and exquisitely responsive to the 
preferences of local residents.264 Local units, especially those charged with 
land-use control, exhibit the traits most closely identified with political 
participation: they are small, yet powerful.265 Local zoning proceedings often 
feature high rates of local participation and provide a robust forum for 
participatory democracy,266 allowing democratic communities to develop their 
character and pursue common goals.267 
Citizen participation in policy making, in turn, promotes local tailoring and 
experimentation. Local implementation enables local regulators to experiment 
with novel implementation techniques with the expectation that optimal 
regulatory strategies will vary by locale.268 Local governments learn from each 
other and from the national government. The national government is able to 
build upon the best practices of its constituent units but avoid locking in a 
suboptimal regulatory standard.269 In this way, the local-official-as-federal-
 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); accord Gerken, supra note 25, at 6 (“[F]ederalism promotes 
choice, competition, participation, experimentation, and the diffusion of power.”); David S. Rubenstein, 
Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1161–63 (2012) (considering values of federalism in 
administrative agencies); Ryan, supra note 27, at 601 (identifying values underlying a federal system of 
government); Ryan, supra note 139, at 10 (listing traditional federalism values). 
 264 See Serkin, supra note 85, at 1649–50 (noting that “actual participation in local decisionmaking is 
relatively easy” and that property owners have both the incentive and political power to influence zoning 
decisions). 
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agent model effectively balances national land-use priorities and local land-use 
concerns. 
CONCLUSION 
Though land is local, land use is not. In the aggregate, local land use 
generates harms that far exceed the remedial capacity of local governments. 
While other formerly local areas have since been subsumed by the states or the 
federal government, land-use law has retained much of its local character. 
Nonetheless, modern land-use law involves a significant, though 
undertheorized, national dimension. In the absence of a national land-use 
policy, scholars have studied individual federal laws that impact the 
development of privately owned land in isolation, describing an uncoordinated 
federal statutory patchwork.  
This Article brings order to the federal patchwork, developing a coherent 
national account of land-use law. This account supplements the traditional 
localist account by (a) demonstrating that federal law can (and sometimes 
should) be used to account for the cumulative effects of local land-use 
decisions on interstate commerce, (b) constructing a theoretical framework 
through which to analyze the existing body of federal land law, and (c) using 
insights of federalism theory to identify the benefits of a local-official-as-
federal-agent model of land-use law. In allocating authority to both national 
and local regulators, this model quite consciously accounts for the unique 
duality of land.   
